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/*
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* FreeRTOS Kernel <DEVELOPMENT BRANCH>
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* Copyright (C) 2021 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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*
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* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
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* this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
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* the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
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* use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of
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* the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so,
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* subject to the following conditions:
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*
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* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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* copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS
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* FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR
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* COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER
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* IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
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*
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* https://www.FreeRTOS.org
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* https://github.com/FreeRTOS
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*
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*/
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/*-----------------------------------------------------------
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* Implementation of functions defined in portable.h for the ARM CM4F MPU port.
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*----------------------------------------------------------*/
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/* IAR includes. */
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#include <intrinsics.h>
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/* Defining MPU_WRAPPERS_INCLUDED_FROM_API_FILE prevents task.h from redefining
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* all the API functions to use the MPU wrappers. That should only be done when
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* task.h is included from an application file. */
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#define MPU_WRAPPERS_INCLUDED_FROM_API_FILE
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/* Scheduler includes. */
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#include "FreeRTOS.h"
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#include "task.h"
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#include "mpu_syscall_numbers.h"
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#undef MPU_WRAPPERS_INCLUDED_FROM_API_FILE
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#ifndef __ARMVFP__
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#error This port can only be used when the project options are configured to enable hardware floating point support.
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#endif
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#if ( configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY == 0 )
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#error configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY must not be set to 0. See http: /*www.FreeRTOS.org/RTOS-Cortex-M3-M4.html */
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#endif
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#ifndef configSYSTICK_CLOCK_HZ
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#define configSYSTICK_CLOCK_HZ configCPU_CLOCK_HZ
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/* Ensure the SysTick is clocked at the same frequency as the core. */
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#define portNVIC_SYSTICK_CLK_BIT ( 1UL << 2UL )
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#else
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/* The way the SysTick is clocked is not modified in case it is not the same
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* as the core. */
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#define portNVIC_SYSTICK_CLK_BIT ( 0 )
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#endif
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#ifndef configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS
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#warning "configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS is not defined. We recommend defining it to 0 in FreeRTOSConfig.h for better security."
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#define configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS 1
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#endif
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/* Constants required to manipulate the core. Registers first... */
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#define portNVIC_SYSTICK_CTRL_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000e010 ) )
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#define portNVIC_SYSTICK_LOAD_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000e014 ) )
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#define portNVIC_SYSTICK_CURRENT_VALUE_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000e018 ) )
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#define portNVIC_SHPR3_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000ed20 ) )
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#define portNVIC_SHPR2_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000ed1c ) )
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#define portNVIC_SYS_CTRL_STATE_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000ed24 ) )
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#define portNVIC_MEM_FAULT_ENABLE ( 1UL << 16UL )
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/* Constants required to access and manipulate the MPU. */
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#define portMPU_TYPE_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000ed90 ) )
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#define portMPU_REGION_BASE_ADDRESS_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000ed9C ) )
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#define portMPU_REGION_ATTRIBUTE_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000edA0 ) )
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#define portMPU_CTRL_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000ed94 ) )
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#define portEXPECTED_MPU_TYPE_VALUE ( configTOTAL_MPU_REGIONS << 8UL )
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#define portMPU_ENABLE ( 0x01UL )
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#define portMPU_BACKGROUND_ENABLE ( 1UL << 2UL )
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#define portPRIVILEGED_EXECUTION_START_ADDRESS ( 0UL )
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#define portMPU_REGION_VALID ( 0x10UL )
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#define portMPU_REGION_ENABLE ( 0x01UL )
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#define portPERIPHERALS_START_ADDRESS 0x40000000UL
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#define portPERIPHERALS_END_ADDRESS 0x5FFFFFFFUL
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/* ...then bits in the registers. */
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#define portNVIC_SYSTICK_INT_BIT ( 1UL << 1UL )
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#define portNVIC_SYSTICK_ENABLE_BIT ( 1UL << 0UL )
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#define portNVIC_SYSTICK_COUNT_FLAG_BIT ( 1UL << 16UL )
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#define portNVIC_PENDSVCLEAR_BIT ( 1UL << 27UL )
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#define portNVIC_PEND_SYSTICK_CLEAR_BIT ( 1UL << 25UL )
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/* Constants used to detect Cortex-M7 r0p0 and r0p1 cores, and ensure
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* that a work around is active for errata 837070. */
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#define portCPUID ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xE000ed00 ) )
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#define portCORTEX_M7_r0p1_ID ( 0x410FC271UL )
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#define portCORTEX_M7_r0p0_ID ( 0x410FC270UL )
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#define portMIN_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY ( 255UL )
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#define portNVIC_PENDSV_PRI ( ( ( uint32_t ) portMIN_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY ) << 16UL )
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#define portNVIC_SYSTICK_PRI ( ( ( uint32_t ) portMIN_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY ) << 24UL )
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#define portNVIC_SVC_PRI ( ( ( uint32_t ) configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY - 1UL ) << 24UL )
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/* Constants required to check the validity of an interrupt priority. */
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#define portFIRST_USER_INTERRUPT_NUMBER ( 16 )
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#define portNVIC_IP_REGISTERS_OFFSET_16 ( 0xE000E3F0 )
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#define portAIRCR_REG ( *( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xE000ED0C ) )
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#define portMAX_8_BIT_VALUE ( ( uint8_t ) 0xff )
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#define portTOP_BIT_OF_BYTE ( ( uint8_t ) 0x80 )
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#define portMAX_PRIGROUP_BITS ( ( uint8_t ) 7 )
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#define portPRIORITY_GROUP_MASK ( 0x07UL << 8UL )
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#define portPRIGROUP_SHIFT ( 8UL )
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/* Masks off all bits but the VECTACTIVE bits in the ICSR register. */
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#define portVECTACTIVE_MASK ( 0xFFUL )
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/* Constants required to manipulate the VFP. */
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#define portFPCCR ( ( volatile uint32_t * ) 0xe000ef34 ) /* Floating point context control register. */
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#define portASPEN_AND_LSPEN_BITS ( 0x3UL << 30UL )
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/* Constants required to set up the initial stack. */
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#define portINITIAL_XPSR ( 0x01000000 )
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#define portINITIAL_EXC_RETURN ( 0xfffffffd )
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#define portINITIAL_CONTROL_IF_UNPRIVILEGED ( 0x03 )
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#define portINITIAL_CONTROL_IF_PRIVILEGED ( 0x02 )
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Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
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/* Constants used during system call enter and exit. */
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#define portPSR_STACK_PADDING_MASK ( 1UL << 9UL )
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#define portEXC_RETURN_STACK_FRAME_TYPE_MASK ( 1UL << 4UL )
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/* Offsets in the stack to the parameters when inside the SVC handler. */
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
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#define portOFFSET_TO_LR ( 5 )
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#define portOFFSET_TO_PC ( 6 )
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
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#define portOFFSET_TO_PSR ( 7 )
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/* The systick is a 24-bit counter. */
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#define portMAX_24_BIT_NUMBER ( 0xffffffUL )
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/* A fiddle factor to estimate the number of SysTick counts that would have
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* occurred while the SysTick counter is stopped during tickless idle
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* calculations. */
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#define portMISSED_COUNTS_FACTOR ( 45UL )
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/* For strict compliance with the Cortex-M spec the task start address should
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* have bit-0 clear, as it is loaded into the PC on exit from an ISR. */
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#define portSTART_ADDRESS_MASK ( ( StackType_t ) 0xfffffffeUL )
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|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
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/* Does addr lie within [start, end] address range? */
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#define portIS_ADDRESS_WITHIN_RANGE( addr, start, end ) \
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( ( ( addr ) >= ( start ) ) && ( ( addr ) <= ( end ) ) )
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/* Is the access request satisfied by the available permissions? */
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#define portIS_AUTHORIZED( accessRequest, permissions ) \
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( ( ( permissions ) & ( accessRequest ) ) == accessRequest )
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/* Max value that fits in a uint32_t type. */
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#define portUINT32_MAX ( ~( ( uint32_t ) 0 ) )
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/* Check if adding a and b will result in overflow. */
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#define portADD_UINT32_WILL_OVERFLOW( a, b ) ( ( a ) > ( portUINT32_MAX - ( b ) ) )
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/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
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/*
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* Configure a number of standard MPU regions that are used by all tasks.
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*/
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static void prvSetupMPU( void ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
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/*
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* Return the smallest MPU region size that a given number of bytes will fit
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* into. The region size is returned as the value that should be programmed
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* into the region attribute register for that region.
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*/
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static uint32_t prvGetMPURegionSizeSetting( uint32_t ulActualSizeInBytes ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
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/*
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* Setup the timer to generate the tick interrupts. The implementation in this
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* file is weak to allow application writers to change the timer used to
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* generate the tick interrupt.
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*/
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void vPortSetupTimerInterrupt( void );
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/*
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* Exception handlers.
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*/
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void xPortSysTickHandler( void ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
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/*
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* Start first task is a separate function so it can be tested in isolation.
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*/
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extern void vPortStartFirstTask( void ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
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/*
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* Turn the VFP on.
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*/
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|
|
extern void vPortEnableVFP( void );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The C portion of the SVC handler.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
void vPortSVCHandler_C( uint32_t * pulParam ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called from the SVC handler used to start the scheduler.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
extern void vPortRestoreContextOfFirstTask( void ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Enter critical section.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if ( configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS == 1 )
|
|
|
|
void vPortEnterCritical( void ) FREERTOS_SYSTEM_CALL;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
void vPortEnterCritical( void ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Exit from critical section.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if ( configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS == 1 )
|
|
|
|
void vPortExitCritical( void ) FREERTOS_SYSTEM_CALL;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
void vPortExitCritical( void ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Sets up the system call stack so that upon returning from
|
|
|
|
* SVC, the system call stack is used.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param pulTaskStack The current SP when the SVC was raised.
|
|
|
|
* @param ulLR The value of Link Register (EXC_RETURN) in the SVC handler.
|
|
|
|
* @param ucSystemCallNumber The system call number of the system call.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void vSystemCallEnter( uint32_t * pulTaskStack,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulLR,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t ucSystemCallNumber ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Raise SVC for exiting from a system call.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void vRequestSystemCallExit( void ) __attribute__( ( naked ) ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Sets up the task stack so that upon returning from
|
|
|
|
* SVC, the task stack is used again.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param pulSystemCallStack The current SP when the SVC was raised.
|
|
|
|
* @param ulLR The value of Link Register (EXC_RETURN) in the SVC handler.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void vSystemCallExit( uint32_t * pulSystemCallStack,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulLR ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Checks whether or not the calling task is privileged.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @return pdTRUE if the calling task is privileged, pdFALSE otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
BaseType_t xPortIsTaskPrivileged( void ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* @brief Make a task unprivileged.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void vPortSwitchToUserMode( void );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Each task maintains its own interrupt status in the critical nesting
|
|
|
|
* variable. */
|
|
|
|
static UBaseType_t uxCriticalNesting = 0xaaaaaaaa;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) && ( configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST == 1 ) )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This variable is set to pdTRUE when the scheduler is started.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
PRIVILEGED_DATA static BaseType_t xSchedulerRunning = pdFALSE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Used by the portASSERT_IF_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY_INVALID() macro to ensure
|
|
|
|
* FreeRTOS API functions are not called from interrupts that have been assigned
|
|
|
|
* a priority above configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if ( configASSERT_DEFINED == 1 )
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t ucMaxSysCallPriority = 0;
|
|
|
|
static uint32_t ulMaxPRIGROUPValue = 0;
|
|
|
|
static const volatile uint8_t * const pcInterruptPriorityRegisters = ( const volatile uint8_t * const ) portNVIC_IP_REGISTERS_OFFSET_16;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* configASSERT_DEFINED */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* See header file for description.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
StackType_t * pxPortInitialiseStack( StackType_t * pxTopOfStack,
|
|
|
|
TaskFunction_t pxCode,
|
|
|
|
void * pvParameters,
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
BaseType_t xRunPrivileged,
|
|
|
|
xMPU_SETTINGS * xMPUSettings )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if( xRunPrivileged == pdTRUE )
|
|
|
|
{
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulTaskFlags |= portTASK_IS_PRIVILEGED_FLAG;
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 0 ] = portINITIAL_CONTROL_IF_PRIVILEGED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulTaskFlags &= ( ~( portTASK_IS_PRIVILEGED_FLAG ) );
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 0 ] = portINITIAL_CONTROL_IF_UNPRIVILEGED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 1 ] = 0x04040404; /* r4. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 2 ] = 0x05050505; /* r5. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 3 ] = 0x06060606; /* r6. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 4 ] = 0x07070707; /* r7. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 5 ] = 0x08080808; /* r8. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 6 ] = 0x09090909; /* r9. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 7 ] = 0x10101010; /* r10. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 8 ] = 0x11111111; /* r11. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 9 ] = portINITIAL_EXC_RETURN; /* EXC_RETURN. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 10 ] = ( uint32_t ) ( pxTopOfStack - 8 ); /* PSP with the hardware saved stack. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 11 ] = ( uint32_t ) pvParameters; /* r0. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 12 ] = 0x01010101; /* r1. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 13 ] = 0x02020202; /* r2. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 14 ] = 0x03030303; /* r3. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 15 ] = 0x12121212; /* r12. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 16 ] = 0; /* LR. */
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 17 ] = ( ( uint32_t ) pxCode ) & portSTART_ADDRESS_MASK; /* PC. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 18 ] = portINITIAL_XPSR; /* xPSR. */
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that the system call stack is double word aligned. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulSystemCallStack = &( xMPUSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.ulSystemCallStackBuffer[ configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE - 1 ] );
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulSystemCallStack = ( uint32_t * ) ( ( uint32_t ) ( xMPUSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulSystemCallStack ) &
|
|
|
|
( uint32_t ) ( ~( portBYTE_ALIGNMENT_MASK ) ) );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is not NULL only for the duration of a system call. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulTaskStack = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) */
|
|
|
|
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
return &( xMPUSettings->ulContext[ 19 ] );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
void vPortSVCHandler_C( uint32_t * pulParam ) /* PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t ucSVCNumber;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulPC;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 1 ) && ( configENFORCE_SYSTEM_CALLS_FROM_KERNEL_ONLY == 1 ) )
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __syscalls_flash_start__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __syscalls_flash_end__[];
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 1 ) && ( configENFORCE_SYSTEM_CALLS_FROM_KERNEL_ONLY == 1 ) ) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The stack contains: r0, r1, r2, r3, r12, LR, PC and xPSR. The first
|
|
|
|
* argument (r0) is pulParam[ 0 ]. */
|
|
|
|
ulPC = pulParam[ portOFFSET_TO_PC ];
|
|
|
|
ucSVCNumber = ( ( uint8_t * ) ulPC )[ -2 ];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch( ucSVCNumber )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
case portSVC_START_SCHEDULER:
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_SHPR2_REG |= portNVIC_SVC_PRI;
|
|
|
|
vPortRestoreContextOfFirstTask();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case portSVC_YIELD:
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_INT_CTRL_REG = portNVIC_PENDSVSET_BIT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Barriers are normally not required
|
|
|
|
* but do ensure the code is completely
|
|
|
|
* within the specified behaviour for the
|
|
|
|
* architecture. */
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile ( "dsb" ::: "memory" );
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile ( "isb" );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 1 )
|
|
|
|
#if ( configENFORCE_SYSTEM_CALLS_FROM_KERNEL_ONLY == 1 )
|
|
|
|
case portSVC_RAISE_PRIVILEGE: /* Only raise the privilege, if the
|
|
|
|
* svc was raised from any of the
|
|
|
|
* system calls. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( ( ulPC >= ( uint32_t ) __syscalls_flash_start__ ) &&
|
|
|
|
( ulPC <= ( uint32_t ) __syscalls_flash_end__ ) )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
" mrs r1, control \n" /* Obtain current control value. */
|
|
|
|
" bic r1, r1, #1 \n" /* Set privilege bit. */
|
|
|
|
" msr control, r1 \n" /* Write back new control value. */
|
|
|
|
::: "r1", "memory"
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#else /* if ( configENFORCE_SYSTEM_CALLS_FROM_KERNEL_ONLY == 1 ) */
|
|
|
|
case portSVC_RAISE_PRIVILEGE:
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile
|
|
|
|
(
|
|
|
|
" mrs r1, control \n" /* Obtain current control value. */
|
|
|
|
" bic r1, r1, #1 \n" /* Set privilege bit. */
|
|
|
|
" msr control, r1 \n" /* Write back new control value. */
|
|
|
|
::: "r1", "memory"
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if( configENFORCE_SYSTEM_CALLS_FROM_KERNEL_ONLY == 1 ) */
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 1 ) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default: /* Unknown SVC call. */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
#if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vSystemCallEnter( uint32_t * pulTaskStack,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulLR,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t ucSystemCallNumber ) /* PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
extern TaskHandle_t pxCurrentTCB;
|
|
|
|
extern UBaseType_t uxSystemCallImplementations[ NUM_SYSTEM_CALLS ];
|
|
|
|
xMPU_SETTINGS * pxMpuSettings;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t * pulSystemCallStack;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulStackFrameSize, ulSystemCallLocation, i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined( __ARMCC_VERSION )
|
|
|
|
/* Declaration when these variable are defined in code instead of being
|
|
|
|
* exported from linker scripts. */
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t * __syscalls_flash_start__;
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t * __syscalls_flash_end__;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
/* Declaration when these variable are exported from linker scripts. */
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __syscalls_flash_start__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __syscalls_flash_end__[];
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if defined( __ARMCC_VERSION ) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ulSystemCallLocation = pulTaskStack[ portOFFSET_TO_PC ];
|
|
|
|
pxMpuSettings = xTaskGetMPUSettings( pxCurrentTCB );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Checks:
|
|
|
|
* 1. SVC is raised from the system call section (i.e. application is
|
|
|
|
* not raising SVC directly).
|
|
|
|
* 2. pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulTaskStack must be NULL as
|
|
|
|
* it is non-NULL only during the execution of a system call (i.e.
|
|
|
|
* between system call enter and exit).
|
|
|
|
* 3. System call is not for a kernel API disabled by the configuration
|
|
|
|
* in FreeRTOSConfig.h.
|
|
|
|
* 4. We do not need to check that ucSystemCallNumber is within range
|
|
|
|
* because the assembly SVC handler checks that before calling
|
|
|
|
* this function.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if( ( ulSystemCallLocation >= ( uint32_t ) __syscalls_flash_start__ ) &&
|
|
|
|
( ulSystemCallLocation <= ( uint32_t ) __syscalls_flash_end__ ) &&
|
|
|
|
( pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulTaskStack == NULL ) &&
|
|
|
|
( uxSystemCallImplementations[ ucSystemCallNumber ] != ( UBaseType_t ) 0 ) )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pulSystemCallStack = pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulSystemCallStack;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( ( ulLR & portEXC_RETURN_STACK_FRAME_TYPE_MASK ) == 0UL )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Extended frame i.e. FPU in use. */
|
|
|
|
ulStackFrameSize = 26;
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile (
|
|
|
|
" vpush {s0} \n" /* Trigger lazy stacking. */
|
|
|
|
" vpop {s0} \n" /* Nullify the affect of the above instruction. */
|
|
|
|
::: "memory"
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Standard frame i.e. FPU not in use. */
|
|
|
|
ulStackFrameSize = 8;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make space on the system call stack for the stack frame. */
|
|
|
|
pulSystemCallStack = pulSystemCallStack - ulStackFrameSize;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the stack frame. */
|
|
|
|
for( i = 0; i < ulStackFrameSize; i++ )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pulSystemCallStack[ i ] = pulTaskStack[ i ];
|
|
|
|
}
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Use the pulSystemCallStack in thread mode. */
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile ( "msr psp, %0" : : "r" ( pulSystemCallStack ) );
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Raise the privilege for the duration of the system call. */
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile (
|
|
|
|
" mrs r1, control \n" /* Obtain current control value. */
|
|
|
|
" bic r1, #1 \n" /* Clear nPRIV bit. */
|
|
|
|
" msr control, r1 \n" /* Write back new control value. */
|
|
|
|
::: "r1", "memory"
|
|
|
|
);
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Remember the location where we should copy the stack frame when we exit from
|
|
|
|
* the system call. */
|
|
|
|
pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulTaskStack = pulTaskStack + ulStackFrameSize;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Store the value of the Link Register before the SVC was raised.
|
|
|
|
* It contains the address of the caller of the System Call entry
|
|
|
|
* point (i.e. the caller of the MPU_<API>). We need to restore it
|
|
|
|
* when we exit from the system call. */
|
|
|
|
pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.ulLinkRegisterAtSystemCallEntry = pulTaskStack[ portOFFSET_TO_LR ];
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Start executing the system call upon returning from this handler. */
|
|
|
|
pulSystemCallStack[ portOFFSET_TO_PC ] = uxSystemCallImplementations[ ucSystemCallNumber ];
|
|
|
|
/* Raise a request to exit from the system call upon finishing the
|
|
|
|
* system call. */
|
|
|
|
pulSystemCallStack[ portOFFSET_TO_LR ] = ( uint32_t ) vRequestSystemCallExit;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Record if the hardware used padding to force the stack pointer
|
|
|
|
* to be double word aligned. */
|
|
|
|
if( ( pulTaskStack[ portOFFSET_TO_PSR ] & portPSR_STACK_PADDING_MASK ) == portPSR_STACK_PADDING_MASK )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pxMpuSettings->ulTaskFlags |= portSTACK_FRAME_HAS_PADDING_FLAG;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pxMpuSettings->ulTaskFlags &= ( ~portSTACK_FRAME_HAS_PADDING_FLAG );
|
|
|
|
}
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We ensure in pxPortInitialiseStack that the system call stack is
|
|
|
|
* double word aligned and therefore, there is no need of padding.
|
|
|
|
* Clear the bit[9] of stacked xPSR. */
|
|
|
|
pulSystemCallStack[ portOFFSET_TO_PSR ] &= ( ~portPSR_STACK_PADDING_MASK );
|
|
|
|
}
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) */
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vRequestSystemCallExit( void ) /* __attribute__( ( naked ) ) PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile ( "svc %0 \n" ::"i" ( portSVC_SYSTEM_CALL_EXIT ) : "memory" );
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) */
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vSystemCallExit( uint32_t * pulSystemCallStack,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulLR ) /* PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
extern TaskHandle_t pxCurrentTCB;
|
|
|
|
xMPU_SETTINGS * pxMpuSettings;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t * pulTaskStack;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulStackFrameSize, ulSystemCallLocation, i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined( __ARMCC_VERSION )
|
|
|
|
/* Declaration when these variable are defined in code instead of being
|
|
|
|
* exported from linker scripts. */
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t * __privileged_functions_start__;
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t * __privileged_functions_end__;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
/* Declaration when these variable are exported from linker scripts. */
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __privileged_functions_start__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __privileged_functions_end__[];
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if defined( __ARMCC_VERSION ) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ulSystemCallLocation = pulSystemCallStack[ portOFFSET_TO_PC ];
|
|
|
|
pxMpuSettings = xTaskGetMPUSettings( pxCurrentTCB );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Checks:
|
|
|
|
* 1. SVC is raised from the privileged code (i.e. application is not
|
|
|
|
* raising SVC directly). This SVC is only raised from
|
|
|
|
* vRequestSystemCallExit which is in the privileged code section.
|
|
|
|
* 2. pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulTaskStack must not be NULL -
|
|
|
|
* this means that we previously entered a system call and the
|
|
|
|
* application is not attempting to exit without entering a system
|
|
|
|
* call.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if( ( ulSystemCallLocation >= ( uint32_t ) __privileged_functions_start__ ) &&
|
|
|
|
( ulSystemCallLocation <= ( uint32_t ) __privileged_functions_end__ ) &&
|
|
|
|
( pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulTaskStack != NULL ) )
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pulTaskStack = pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulTaskStack;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( ( ulLR & portEXC_RETURN_STACK_FRAME_TYPE_MASK ) == 0UL )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Extended frame i.e. FPU in use. */
|
|
|
|
ulStackFrameSize = 26;
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile (
|
|
|
|
" vpush {s0} \n" /* Trigger lazy stacking. */
|
|
|
|
" vpop {s0} \n" /* Nullify the affect of the above instruction. */
|
|
|
|
::: "memory"
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Standard frame i.e. FPU not in use. */
|
|
|
|
ulStackFrameSize = 8;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make space on the task stack for the stack frame. */
|
|
|
|
pulTaskStack = pulTaskStack - ulStackFrameSize;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the stack frame. */
|
|
|
|
for( i = 0; i < ulStackFrameSize; i++ )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pulTaskStack[ i ] = pulSystemCallStack[ i ];
|
|
|
|
}
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Use the pulTaskStack in thread mode. */
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile ( "msr psp, %0" : : "r" ( pulTaskStack ) );
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Drop the privilege before returning to the thread mode. */
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile (
|
|
|
|
" mrs r1, control \n" /* Obtain current control value. */
|
|
|
|
" orr r1, #1 \n" /* Set nPRIV bit. */
|
|
|
|
" msr control, r1 \n" /* Write back new control value. */
|
|
|
|
::: "r1", "memory"
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return to the caller of the System Call entry point (i.e. the
|
|
|
|
* caller of the MPU_<API>). */
|
|
|
|
pulTaskStack[ portOFFSET_TO_PC ] = pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.ulLinkRegisterAtSystemCallEntry;
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that LR has a valid value.*/
|
|
|
|
pulTaskStack[ portOFFSET_TO_LR ] = pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.ulLinkRegisterAtSystemCallEntry;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the hardware used padding to force the stack pointer
|
|
|
|
* to be double word aligned, set the stacked xPSR bit[9],
|
|
|
|
* otherwise clear it. */
|
|
|
|
if( ( pxMpuSettings->ulTaskFlags & portSTACK_FRAME_HAS_PADDING_FLAG ) == portSTACK_FRAME_HAS_PADDING_FLAG )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pulTaskStack[ portOFFSET_TO_PSR ] |= portPSR_STACK_PADDING_MASK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pulTaskStack[ portOFFSET_TO_PSR ] &= ( ~portPSR_STACK_PADDING_MASK );
|
|
|
|
}
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is not NULL only for the duration of the system call. */
|
|
|
|
pxMpuSettings->xSystemCallStackInfo.pulTaskStack = NULL;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) */
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BaseType_t xPortIsTaskPrivileged( void ) /* PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
BaseType_t xTaskIsPrivileged = pdFALSE;
|
|
|
|
const xMPU_SETTINGS * xTaskMpuSettings = xTaskGetMPUSettings( NULL ); /* Calling task's MPU settings. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( ( xTaskMpuSettings->ulTaskFlags & portTASK_IS_PRIVILEGED_FLAG ) == portTASK_IS_PRIVILEGED_FLAG )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xTaskIsPrivileged = pdTRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return xTaskIsPrivileged;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vPortSwitchToUserMode( void )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Load the current task's MPU settings from its TCB. */
|
|
|
|
xMPU_SETTINGS * xTaskMpuSettings = xTaskGetMPUSettings( NULL );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Mark the task as unprivileged. */
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings->ulTaskFlags &= ( ~( portTASK_IS_PRIVILEGED_FLAG ) );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Lower the processor's privilege level. */
|
|
|
|
vResetPrivilege();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* See header file for description.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
BaseType_t xPortStartScheduler( void )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Errata 837070 workaround must only be enabled on Cortex-M7 r0p0
|
|
|
|
* and r0p1 cores. */
|
|
|
|
#if ( configENABLE_ERRATA_837070_WORKAROUND == 1 )
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ( portCPUID == portCORTEX_M7_r0p1_ID ) || ( portCPUID == portCORTEX_M7_r0p0_ID ) );
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* When using this port on a Cortex-M7 r0p0 or r0p1 core, define
|
|
|
|
* configENABLE_ERRATA_837070_WORKAROUND to 1 in your
|
|
|
|
* FreeRTOSConfig.h. */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( portCPUID != portCORTEX_M7_r0p1_ID );
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( portCPUID != portCORTEX_M7_r0p0_ID );
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configASSERT_DEFINED == 1 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
volatile uint8_t ucOriginalPriority;
|
|
|
|
volatile uint32_t ulImplementedPrioBits = 0;
|
|
|
|
volatile uint8_t * const pucFirstUserPriorityRegister = ( volatile uint8_t * const ) ( portNVIC_IP_REGISTERS_OFFSET_16 + portFIRST_USER_INTERRUPT_NUMBER );
|
|
|
|
volatile uint8_t ucMaxPriorityValue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Determine the maximum priority from which ISR safe FreeRTOS API
|
|
|
|
* functions can be called. ISR safe functions are those that end in
|
|
|
|
* "FromISR". FreeRTOS maintains separate thread and ISR API functions to
|
|
|
|
* ensure interrupt entry is as fast and simple as possible.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Save the interrupt priority value that is about to be clobbered. */
|
|
|
|
ucOriginalPriority = *pucFirstUserPriorityRegister;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Determine the number of priority bits available. First write to all
|
|
|
|
* possible bits. */
|
|
|
|
*pucFirstUserPriorityRegister = portMAX_8_BIT_VALUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the value back to see how many bits stuck. */
|
|
|
|
ucMaxPriorityValue = *pucFirstUserPriorityRegister;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Use the same mask on the maximum system call priority. */
|
|
|
|
ucMaxSysCallPriority = configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY & ucMaxPriorityValue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the maximum system call priority is nonzero after
|
|
|
|
* accounting for the number of priority bits supported by the
|
|
|
|
* hardware. A priority of 0 is invalid because setting the BASEPRI
|
|
|
|
* register to 0 unmasks all interrupts, and interrupts with priority 0
|
|
|
|
* cannot be masked using BASEPRI.
|
|
|
|
* See https://www.FreeRTOS.org/RTOS-Cortex-M3-M4.html */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ucMaxSysCallPriority );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the bits not implemented in hardware are zero in
|
|
|
|
* configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY. */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ( configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY & ( uint8_t ) ( ~( uint32_t ) ucMaxPriorityValue ) ) == 0U );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate the maximum acceptable priority group value for the number
|
|
|
|
* of bits read back. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while( ( ucMaxPriorityValue & portTOP_BIT_OF_BYTE ) == portTOP_BIT_OF_BYTE )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ulImplementedPrioBits++;
|
|
|
|
ucMaxPriorityValue <<= ( uint8_t ) 0x01;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( ulImplementedPrioBits == 8 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* When the hardware implements 8 priority bits, there is no way for
|
|
|
|
* the software to configure PRIGROUP to not have sub-priorities. As
|
|
|
|
* a result, the least significant bit is always used for sub-priority
|
|
|
|
* and there are 128 preemption priorities and 2 sub-priorities.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This may cause some confusion in some cases - for example, if
|
|
|
|
* configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY is set to 5, both 5 and 4
|
|
|
|
* priority interrupts will be masked in Critical Sections as those
|
|
|
|
* are at the same preemption priority. This may appear confusing as
|
|
|
|
* 4 is higher (numerically lower) priority than
|
|
|
|
* configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY and therefore, should not
|
|
|
|
* have been masked. Instead, if we set configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY
|
|
|
|
* to 4, this confusion does not happen and the behaviour remains the same.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The following assert ensures that the sub-priority bit in the
|
|
|
|
* configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY is clear to avoid the above mentioned
|
|
|
|
* confusion. */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ( configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY & 0x1U ) == 0U );
|
|
|
|
ulMaxPRIGROUPValue = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ulMaxPRIGROUPValue = portMAX_PRIGROUP_BITS - ulImplementedPrioBits;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Shift the priority group value back to its position within the AIRCR
|
|
|
|
* register. */
|
|
|
|
ulMaxPRIGROUPValue <<= portPRIGROUP_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
ulMaxPRIGROUPValue &= portPRIORITY_GROUP_MASK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Restore the clobbered interrupt priority register to its original
|
|
|
|
* value. */
|
|
|
|
*pucFirstUserPriorityRegister = ucOriginalPriority;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* configASSERT_DEFINED */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make PendSV and SysTick the lowest priority interrupts. */
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_SHPR3_REG |= portNVIC_PENDSV_PRI;
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_SHPR3_REG |= portNVIC_SYSTICK_PRI;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Configure the regions in the MPU that are common to all tasks. */
|
|
|
|
prvSetupMPU();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Start the timer that generates the tick ISR. Interrupts are disabled
|
|
|
|
* here already. */
|
|
|
|
vPortSetupTimerInterrupt();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Initialise the critical nesting count ready for the first task. */
|
|
|
|
uxCriticalNesting = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) && ( configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST == 1 ) )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xSchedulerRunning = pdTRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure the VFP is enabled - it should be anyway. */
|
|
|
|
vPortEnableVFP();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Lazy save always. */
|
|
|
|
*( portFPCCR ) |= portASPEN_AND_LSPEN_BITS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Start the first task. */
|
|
|
|
vPortStartFirstTask();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Should not get here! */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vPortEndScheduler( void )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Not implemented in ports where there is nothing to return to.
|
|
|
|
* Artificially force an assert. */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( uxCriticalNesting == 1000UL );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vPortEnterCritical( void )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#if ( configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS == 1 )
|
|
|
|
if( portIS_PRIVILEGED() == pdFALSE )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
portRAISE_PRIVILEGE();
|
|
|
|
portMEMORY_BARRIER();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
portDISABLE_INTERRUPTS();
|
|
|
|
uxCriticalNesting++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is not the interrupt safe version of the enter critical function so
|
|
|
|
* assert() if it is being called from an interrupt context. Only API
|
|
|
|
* functions that end in "FromISR" can be used in an interrupt. Only assert if
|
|
|
|
* the critical nesting count is 1 to protect against recursive calls if the
|
|
|
|
* assert function also uses a critical section. */
|
|
|
|
if( uxCriticalNesting == 1 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ( portNVIC_INT_CTRL_REG & portVECTACTIVE_MASK ) == 0 );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
portMEMORY_BARRIER();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
portRESET_PRIVILEGE();
|
|
|
|
portMEMORY_BARRIER();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
portDISABLE_INTERRUPTS();
|
|
|
|
uxCriticalNesting++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is not the interrupt safe version of the enter critical function so
|
|
|
|
* assert() if it is being called from an interrupt context. Only API
|
|
|
|
* functions that end in "FromISR" can be used in an interrupt. Only assert if
|
|
|
|
* the critical nesting count is 1 to protect against recursive calls if the
|
|
|
|
* assert function also uses a critical section. */
|
|
|
|
if( uxCriticalNesting == 1 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ( portNVIC_INT_CTRL_REG & portVECTACTIVE_MASK ) == 0 );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else /* if ( configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS == 1 ) */
|
|
|
|
portDISABLE_INTERRUPTS();
|
|
|
|
uxCriticalNesting++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is not the interrupt safe version of the enter critical function so
|
|
|
|
* assert() if it is being called from an interrupt context. Only API
|
|
|
|
* functions that end in "FromISR" can be used in an interrupt. Only assert if
|
|
|
|
* the critical nesting count is 1 to protect against recursive calls if the
|
|
|
|
* assert function also uses a critical section. */
|
|
|
|
if( uxCriticalNesting == 1 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ( portNVIC_INT_CTRL_REG & portVECTACTIVE_MASK ) == 0 );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* if ( configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS == 1 ) */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vPortExitCritical( void )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#if ( configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS == 1 )
|
|
|
|
if( portIS_PRIVILEGED() == pdFALSE )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
portRAISE_PRIVILEGE();
|
|
|
|
portMEMORY_BARRIER();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( uxCriticalNesting );
|
|
|
|
uxCriticalNesting--;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( uxCriticalNesting == 0 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
portENABLE_INTERRUPTS();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
portMEMORY_BARRIER();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
portRESET_PRIVILEGE();
|
|
|
|
portMEMORY_BARRIER();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( uxCriticalNesting );
|
|
|
|
uxCriticalNesting--;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( uxCriticalNesting == 0 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
portENABLE_INTERRUPTS();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else /* if ( configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS == 1 ) */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( uxCriticalNesting );
|
|
|
|
uxCriticalNesting--;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( uxCriticalNesting == 0 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
portENABLE_INTERRUPTS();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* if ( configALLOW_UNPRIVILEGED_CRITICAL_SECTIONS == 1 ) */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void xPortSysTickHandler( void )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* The SysTick runs at the lowest interrupt priority, so when this interrupt
|
|
|
|
* executes all interrupts must be unmasked. There is therefore no need to
|
|
|
|
* save and then restore the interrupt mask value as its value is already
|
|
|
|
* known. */
|
|
|
|
portDISABLE_INTERRUPTS();
|
|
|
|
traceISR_ENTER();
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Increment the RTOS tick. */
|
|
|
|
if( xTaskIncrementTick() != pdFALSE )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
traceISR_EXIT_TO_SCHEDULER();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* A context switch is required. Context switching is performed in
|
|
|
|
* the PendSV interrupt. Pend the PendSV interrupt. */
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_INT_CTRL_REG = portNVIC_PENDSVSET_BIT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
traceISR_EXIT();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
portENABLE_INTERRUPTS();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Setup the systick timer to generate the tick interrupts at the required
|
|
|
|
* frequency.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
__weak void vPortSetupTimerInterrupt( void )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Stop and clear the SysTick. */
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_SYSTICK_CTRL_REG = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_SYSTICK_CURRENT_VALUE_REG = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Configure SysTick to interrupt at the requested rate. */
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_SYSTICK_LOAD_REG = ( configSYSTICK_CLOCK_HZ / configTICK_RATE_HZ ) - 1UL;
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_SYSTICK_CTRL_REG = ( portNVIC_SYSTICK_CLK_BIT | portNVIC_SYSTICK_INT_BIT | portNVIC_SYSTICK_ENABLE_BIT );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void prvSetupMPU( void )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __privileged_functions_start__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __privileged_functions_end__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __FLASH_segment_start__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __FLASH_segment_end__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __privileged_data_start__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __privileged_data_end__[];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The only permitted number of regions are 8 or 16. */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ( configTOTAL_MPU_REGIONS == 8 ) || ( configTOTAL_MPU_REGIONS == 16 ) );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that the configTOTAL_MPU_REGIONS is configured correctly. */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( portMPU_TYPE_REG == portEXPECTED_MPU_TYPE_VALUE );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check the expected MPU is present. */
|
|
|
|
if( portMPU_TYPE_REG == portEXPECTED_MPU_TYPE_VALUE )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* First setup the unprivileged flash for unprivileged read only access. */
|
|
|
|
portMPU_REGION_BASE_ADDRESS_REG = ( ( uint32_t ) __FLASH_segment_start__ ) | /* Base address. */
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_VALID ) |
|
|
|
|
( portUNPRIVILEGED_FLASH_REGION );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
portMPU_REGION_ATTRIBUTE_REG = ( portMPU_REGION_READ_ONLY ) |
|
|
|
|
( ( configTEX_S_C_B_FLASH & portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_MASK ) << portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_LOCATION ) |
|
|
|
|
( prvGetMPURegionSizeSetting( ( uint32_t ) __FLASH_segment_end__ - ( uint32_t ) __FLASH_segment_start__ ) ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_ENABLE );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the privileged flash for privileged only access. This is where
|
|
|
|
* the kernel code is placed. */
|
|
|
|
portMPU_REGION_BASE_ADDRESS_REG = ( ( uint32_t ) __privileged_functions_start__ ) | /* Base address. */
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_VALID ) |
|
|
|
|
( portPRIVILEGED_FLASH_REGION );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
portMPU_REGION_ATTRIBUTE_REG = ( portMPU_REGION_PRIVILEGED_READ_ONLY ) |
|
|
|
|
( ( configTEX_S_C_B_FLASH & portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_MASK ) << portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_LOCATION ) |
|
|
|
|
( prvGetMPURegionSizeSetting( ( uint32_t ) __privileged_functions_end__ - ( uint32_t ) __privileged_functions_start__ ) ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_ENABLE );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the privileged data RAM region. This is where the kernel data
|
|
|
|
* is placed. */
|
|
|
|
portMPU_REGION_BASE_ADDRESS_REG = ( ( uint32_t ) __privileged_data_start__ ) | /* Base address. */
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_VALID ) |
|
|
|
|
( portPRIVILEGED_RAM_REGION );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
portMPU_REGION_ATTRIBUTE_REG = ( portMPU_REGION_PRIVILEGED_READ_WRITE ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_EXECUTE_NEVER ) |
|
|
|
|
( ( configTEX_S_C_B_SRAM & portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_MASK ) << portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_LOCATION ) |
|
|
|
|
prvGetMPURegionSizeSetting( ( uint32_t ) __privileged_data_end__ - ( uint32_t ) __privileged_data_start__ ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_ENABLE );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* By default allow everything to access the general peripherals. The
|
|
|
|
* system peripherals and registers are protected. */
|
|
|
|
portMPU_REGION_BASE_ADDRESS_REG = ( portPERIPHERALS_START_ADDRESS ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_VALID ) |
|
|
|
|
( portGENERAL_PERIPHERALS_REGION );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
portMPU_REGION_ATTRIBUTE_REG = ( portMPU_REGION_READ_WRITE | portMPU_REGION_EXECUTE_NEVER ) |
|
|
|
|
( prvGetMPURegionSizeSetting( portPERIPHERALS_END_ADDRESS - portPERIPHERALS_START_ADDRESS ) ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_ENABLE );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Enable the memory fault exception. */
|
|
|
|
portNVIC_SYS_CTRL_STATE_REG |= portNVIC_MEM_FAULT_ENABLE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Enable the MPU with the background region configured. */
|
|
|
|
portMPU_CTRL_REG |= ( portMPU_ENABLE | portMPU_BACKGROUND_ENABLE );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static uint32_t prvGetMPURegionSizeSetting( uint32_t ulActualSizeInBytes )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulRegionSize, ulReturnValue = 4;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* 32 is the smallest region size, 31 is the largest valid value for
|
|
|
|
* ulReturnValue. */
|
|
|
|
for( ulRegionSize = 32UL; ulReturnValue < 31UL; ( ulRegionSize <<= 1UL ) )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if( ulActualSizeInBytes <= ulRegionSize )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ulReturnValue++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Shift the code by one before returning so it can be written directly
|
|
|
|
* into the the correct bit position of the attribute register. */
|
|
|
|
return( ulReturnValue << 1UL );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vPortStoreTaskMPUSettings( xMPU_SETTINGS * xMPUSettings,
|
|
|
|
const struct xMEMORY_REGION * const xRegions,
|
|
|
|
StackType_t * pxBottomOfStack,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulStackDepth )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __SRAM_segment_start__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __SRAM_segment_end__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __privileged_data_start__[];
|
|
|
|
extern uint32_t __privileged_data_end__[];
|
|
|
|
int32_t lIndex;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ul;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( xRegions == NULL )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* No MPU regions are specified so allow access to all RAM. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ 0 ].ulRegionBaseAddress =
|
|
|
|
( ( uint32_t ) __SRAM_segment_start__ ) | /* Base address. */
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_VALID ) |
|
|
|
|
( portSTACK_REGION ); /* Region number. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ 0 ].ulRegionAttribute =
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_READ_WRITE ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_EXECUTE_NEVER ) |
|
|
|
|
( ( configTEX_S_C_B_SRAM & portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_MASK ) << portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_LOCATION ) |
|
|
|
|
( prvGetMPURegionSizeSetting( ( uint32_t ) __SRAM_segment_end__ - ( uint32_t ) __SRAM_segment_start__ ) ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_ENABLE );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ 0 ].ulRegionStartAddress = ( uint32_t ) __SRAM_segment_start__;
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ 0 ].ulRegionEndAddress = ( uint32_t ) __SRAM_segment_end__;
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ 0 ].ulRegionPermissions = ( tskMPU_READ_PERMISSION |
|
|
|
|
tskMPU_WRITE_PERMISSION );
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Invalidate user configurable regions. */
|
|
|
|
for( ul = 1UL; ul <= portNUM_CONFIGURABLE_REGIONS; ul++ )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ ul ].ulRegionBaseAddress = ( ( ul - 1UL ) | portMPU_REGION_VALID );
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ ul ].ulRegionAttribute = 0UL;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionStartAddress = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionEndAddress = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionPermissions = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* This function is called automatically when the task is created - in
|
|
|
|
* which case the stack region parameters will be valid. At all other
|
|
|
|
* times the stack parameters will not be valid and it is assumed that the
|
|
|
|
* stack region has already been configured. */
|
|
|
|
if( ulStackDepth > 0 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Define the region that allows access to the stack. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ 0 ].ulRegionBaseAddress =
|
|
|
|
( ( uint32_t ) pxBottomOfStack ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_VALID ) |
|
|
|
|
( portSTACK_REGION ); /* Region number. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ 0 ].ulRegionAttribute =
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_READ_WRITE ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_EXECUTE_NEVER ) |
|
|
|
|
( prvGetMPURegionSizeSetting( ulStackDepth * ( uint32_t ) sizeof( StackType_t ) ) ) |
|
|
|
|
( ( configTEX_S_C_B_SRAM & portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_MASK ) << portMPU_RASR_TEX_S_C_B_LOCATION ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_ENABLE );
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ 0 ].ulRegionStartAddress = ( uint32_t ) pxBottomOfStack;
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ 0 ].ulRegionEndAddress = ( uint32_t ) ( ( uint32_t ) ( pxBottomOfStack ) +
|
|
|
|
( ulStackDepth * ( uint32_t ) sizeof( StackType_t ) ) - 1UL );
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ 0 ].ulRegionPermissions = ( tskMPU_READ_PERMISSION |
|
|
|
|
tskMPU_WRITE_PERMISSION );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lIndex = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for( ul = 1UL; ul <= portNUM_CONFIGURABLE_REGIONS; ul++ )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if( ( xRegions[ lIndex ] ).ulLengthInBytes > 0UL )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Translate the generic region definition contained in
|
|
|
|
* xRegions into the CM4 specific MPU settings that are then
|
|
|
|
* stored in xMPUSettings. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ ul ].ulRegionBaseAddress =
|
|
|
|
( ( uint32_t ) xRegions[ lIndex ].pvBaseAddress ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_VALID ) |
|
|
|
|
( ul - 1UL ); /* Region number. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ ul ].ulRegionAttribute =
|
|
|
|
( prvGetMPURegionSizeSetting( xRegions[ lIndex ].ulLengthInBytes ) ) |
|
|
|
|
( xRegions[ lIndex ].ulParameters ) |
|
|
|
|
( portMPU_REGION_ENABLE );
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionStartAddress = ( uint32_t ) xRegions[ lIndex ].pvBaseAddress;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionEndAddress = ( uint32_t ) ( ( uint32_t ) xRegions[ lIndex ].pvBaseAddress + xRegions[ lIndex ].ulLengthInBytes - 1UL );
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionPermissions = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
if( ( ( xRegions[ lIndex ].ulParameters & portMPU_REGION_READ_ONLY ) == portMPU_REGION_READ_ONLY ) ||
|
|
|
|
( ( xRegions[ lIndex ].ulParameters & portMPU_REGION_PRIVILEGED_READ_WRITE_UNPRIV_READ_ONLY ) == portMPU_REGION_PRIVILEGED_READ_WRITE_UNPRIV_READ_ONLY ) )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionPermissions = tskMPU_READ_PERMISSION;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
if( ( xRegions[ lIndex ].ulParameters & portMPU_REGION_READ_WRITE ) == portMPU_REGION_READ_WRITE )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionPermissions = ( tskMPU_READ_PERMISSION | tskMPU_WRITE_PERMISSION );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Invalidate the region. */
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ ul ].ulRegionBaseAddress = ( ( ul - 1UL ) | portMPU_REGION_VALID );
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegion[ ul ].ulRegionAttribute = 0UL;
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionStartAddress = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionEndAddress = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
xMPUSettings->xRegionSettings[ ul ].ulRegionPermissions = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lIndex++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements (#705)
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
2 years ago
|
|
|
BaseType_t xPortIsAuthorizedToAccessBuffer( const void * pvBuffer,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulBufferLength,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulAccessRequested ) /* PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t i, ulBufferStartAddress, ulBufferEndAddress;
|
|
|
|
BaseType_t xAccessGranted = pdFALSE;
|
|
|
|
const xMPU_SETTINGS * xTaskMpuSettings = xTaskGetMPUSettings( NULL ); /* Calling task's MPU settings. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( ( xTaskMpuSettings->ulTaskFlags & portTASK_IS_PRIVILEGED_FLAG ) == portTASK_IS_PRIVILEGED_FLAG )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xAccessGranted = pdTRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if( portADD_UINT32_WILL_OVERFLOW( ( ( uint32_t ) pvBuffer ), ( ulBufferLength - 1UL ) ) == pdFALSE )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ulBufferStartAddress = ( uint32_t ) pvBuffer;
|
|
|
|
ulBufferEndAddress = ( ( ( uint32_t ) pvBuffer ) + ulBufferLength - 1UL );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for( i = 0; i < portTOTAL_NUM_REGIONS_IN_TCB; i++ )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if( portIS_ADDRESS_WITHIN_RANGE( ulBufferStartAddress,
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings->xRegionSettings[ i ].ulRegionStartAddress,
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings->xRegionSettings[ i ].ulRegionEndAddress ) &&
|
|
|
|
portIS_ADDRESS_WITHIN_RANGE( ulBufferEndAddress,
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings->xRegionSettings[ i ].ulRegionStartAddress,
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings->xRegionSettings[ i ].ulRegionEndAddress ) &&
|
|
|
|
portIS_AUTHORIZED( ulAccessRequested, xTaskMpuSettings->xRegionSettings[ i ].ulRegionPermissions ) )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xAccessGranted = pdTRUE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return xAccessGranted;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configASSERT_DEFINED == 1 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vPortValidateInterruptPriority( void )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulCurrentInterrupt;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t ucCurrentPriority;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Obtain the number of the currently executing interrupt. */
|
|
|
|
__asm volatile ( "mrs %0, ipsr" : "=r" ( ulCurrentInterrupt )::"memory" );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Is the interrupt number a user defined interrupt? */
|
|
|
|
if( ulCurrentInterrupt >= portFIRST_USER_INTERRUPT_NUMBER )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Look up the interrupt's priority. */
|
|
|
|
ucCurrentPriority = pcInterruptPriorityRegisters[ ulCurrentInterrupt ];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The following assertion will fail if a service routine (ISR) for
|
|
|
|
* an interrupt that has been assigned a priority above
|
|
|
|
* configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY calls an ISR safe FreeRTOS API
|
|
|
|
* function. ISR safe FreeRTOS API functions must *only* be called
|
|
|
|
* from interrupts that have been assigned a priority at or below
|
|
|
|
* configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Numerically low interrupt priority numbers represent logically high
|
|
|
|
* interrupt priorities, therefore the priority of the interrupt must
|
|
|
|
* be set to a value equal to or numerically *higher* than
|
|
|
|
* configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Interrupts that use the FreeRTOS API must not be left at their
|
|
|
|
* default priority of zero as that is the highest possible priority,
|
|
|
|
* which is guaranteed to be above configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY,
|
|
|
|
* and therefore also guaranteed to be invalid.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* FreeRTOS maintains separate thread and ISR API functions to ensure
|
|
|
|
* interrupt entry is as fast and simple as possible.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The following links provide detailed information:
|
|
|
|
* https://www.FreeRTOS.org/RTOS-Cortex-M3-M4.html
|
|
|
|
* https://www.FreeRTOS.org/FAQHelp.html */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ucCurrentPriority >= ucMaxSysCallPriority );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Priority grouping: The interrupt controller (NVIC) allows the bits
|
|
|
|
* that define each interrupt's priority to be split between bits that
|
|
|
|
* define the interrupt's pre-emption priority bits and bits that define
|
|
|
|
* the interrupt's sub-priority. For simplicity all bits must be defined
|
|
|
|
* to be pre-emption priority bits. The following assertion will fail if
|
|
|
|
* this is not the case (if some bits represent a sub-priority).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the application only uses CMSIS libraries for interrupt
|
|
|
|
* configuration then the correct setting can be achieved on all Cortex-M
|
|
|
|
* devices by calling NVIC_SetPriorityGrouping( 0 ); before starting the
|
|
|
|
* scheduler. Note however that some vendor specific peripheral libraries
|
|
|
|
* assume a non-zero priority group setting, in which cases using a value
|
|
|
|
* of zero will result in unpredictable behaviour. */
|
|
|
|
configASSERT( ( portAIRCR_REG & portPRIORITY_GROUP_MASK ) <= ulMaxPRIGROUPValue );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* configASSERT_DEFINED */
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
Add Access Control List to MPU ports (#765)
This PR adds Access Control to kernel objects on a per task basis to MPU
ports. The following needs to be defined in the `FreeRTOSConfig.h` to
enable this feature:
```c
#define configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 0
#define configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST 1
```
This PR adds the following new APIs:
```c
void vGrantAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToRevokeAccess );
```
An unprivileged task by default has access to itself only and no other
kernel object. The application writer needs to explicitly grant an
unprivileged task access to all the kernel objects it needs. The best
place to do that is before starting the scheduler when all the kernel
objects are created.
For example, let's say an unprivileged tasks needs access to a queue and
an event group, the application writer needs to do the following:
```c
vGrantAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vGrantAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
The application writer MUST revoke all the accesses before deleting a
task. Failing to do so will result in undefined behavior. In the above
example, the application writer needs to make the following 2 calls
before deleting the task:
```c
vRevokeAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
1 year ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) && ( configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST == 1 ) )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vPortGrantAccessToKernelObject( TaskHandle_t xInternalTaskHandle,
|
|
|
|
int32_t lInternalIndexOfKernelObject ) /* PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulAccessControlListEntryIndex, ulAccessControlListEntryBit;
|
|
|
|
xMPU_SETTINGS * xTaskMpuSettings;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ulAccessControlListEntryIndex = ( ( uint32_t ) lInternalIndexOfKernelObject / portACL_ENTRY_SIZE_BITS );
|
|
|
|
ulAccessControlListEntryBit = ( ( uint32_t ) lInternalIndexOfKernelObject % portACL_ENTRY_SIZE_BITS );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings = xTaskGetMPUSettings( xInternalTaskHandle );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings->ulAccessControlList[ ulAccessControlListEntryIndex ] |= ( 1U << ulAccessControlListEntryBit );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) && ( configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST == 1 ) ) */
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) && ( configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST == 1 ) )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vPortRevokeAccessToKernelObject( TaskHandle_t xInternalTaskHandle,
|
|
|
|
int32_t lInternalIndexOfKernelObject ) /* PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulAccessControlListEntryIndex, ulAccessControlListEntryBit;
|
|
|
|
xMPU_SETTINGS * xTaskMpuSettings;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ulAccessControlListEntryIndex = ( ( uint32_t ) lInternalIndexOfKernelObject / portACL_ENTRY_SIZE_BITS );
|
|
|
|
ulAccessControlListEntryBit = ( ( uint32_t ) lInternalIndexOfKernelObject % portACL_ENTRY_SIZE_BITS );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings = xTaskGetMPUSettings( xInternalTaskHandle );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings->ulAccessControlList[ ulAccessControlListEntryIndex ] &= ~( 1U << ulAccessControlListEntryBit );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* #if ( ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) && ( configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST == 1 ) ) */
|
|
|
|
/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if ( configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST == 1 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BaseType_t xPortIsAuthorizedToAccessKernelObject( int32_t lInternalIndexOfKernelObject ) /* PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t ulAccessControlListEntryIndex, ulAccessControlListEntryBit;
|
|
|
|
BaseType_t xAccessGranted = pdFALSE;
|
|
|
|
const xMPU_SETTINGS * xTaskMpuSettings;
|
Add Access Control List to MPU ports (#765)
This PR adds Access Control to kernel objects on a per task basis to MPU
ports. The following needs to be defined in the `FreeRTOSConfig.h` to
enable this feature:
```c
#define configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 0
#define configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST 1
```
This PR adds the following new APIs:
```c
void vGrantAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToRevokeAccess );
```
An unprivileged task by default has access to itself only and no other
kernel object. The application writer needs to explicitly grant an
unprivileged task access to all the kernel objects it needs. The best
place to do that is before starting the scheduler when all the kernel
objects are created.
For example, let's say an unprivileged tasks needs access to a queue and
an event group, the application writer needs to do the following:
```c
vGrantAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vGrantAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
The application writer MUST revoke all the accesses before deleting a
task. Failing to do so will result in undefined behavior. In the above
example, the application writer needs to make the following 2 calls
before deleting the task:
```c
vRevokeAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
1 year ago
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( xSchedulerRunning == pdFALSE )
|
Add Access Control List to MPU ports (#765)
This PR adds Access Control to kernel objects on a per task basis to MPU
ports. The following needs to be defined in the `FreeRTOSConfig.h` to
enable this feature:
```c
#define configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 0
#define configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST 1
```
This PR adds the following new APIs:
```c
void vGrantAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToRevokeAccess );
```
An unprivileged task by default has access to itself only and no other
kernel object. The application writer needs to explicitly grant an
unprivileged task access to all the kernel objects it needs. The best
place to do that is before starting the scheduler when all the kernel
objects are created.
For example, let's say an unprivileged tasks needs access to a queue and
an event group, the application writer needs to do the following:
```c
vGrantAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vGrantAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
The application writer MUST revoke all the accesses before deleting a
task. Failing to do so will result in undefined behavior. In the above
example, the application writer needs to make the following 2 calls
before deleting the task:
```c
vRevokeAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
1 year ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Grant access to all the kernel objects before the scheduler
|
|
|
|
* is started. It is necessary because there is no task running
|
|
|
|
* yet and therefore, we cannot use the permissions of any
|
|
|
|
* task. */
|
Add Access Control List to MPU ports (#765)
This PR adds Access Control to kernel objects on a per task basis to MPU
ports. The following needs to be defined in the `FreeRTOSConfig.h` to
enable this feature:
```c
#define configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 0
#define configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST 1
```
This PR adds the following new APIs:
```c
void vGrantAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToRevokeAccess );
```
An unprivileged task by default has access to itself only and no other
kernel object. The application writer needs to explicitly grant an
unprivileged task access to all the kernel objects it needs. The best
place to do that is before starting the scheduler when all the kernel
objects are created.
For example, let's say an unprivileged tasks needs access to a queue and
an event group, the application writer needs to do the following:
```c
vGrantAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vGrantAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
The application writer MUST revoke all the accesses before deleting a
task. Failing to do so will result in undefined behavior. In the above
example, the application writer needs to make the following 2 calls
before deleting the task:
```c
vRevokeAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
1 year ago
|
|
|
xAccessGranted = pdTRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xTaskMpuSettings = xTaskGetMPUSettings( NULL ); /* Calling task's MPU settings. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ulAccessControlListEntryIndex = ( ( uint32_t ) lInternalIndexOfKernelObject / portACL_ENTRY_SIZE_BITS );
|
|
|
|
ulAccessControlListEntryBit = ( ( uint32_t ) lInternalIndexOfKernelObject % portACL_ENTRY_SIZE_BITS );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( ( xTaskMpuSettings->ulTaskFlags & portTASK_IS_PRIVILEGED_FLAG ) == portTASK_IS_PRIVILEGED_FLAG )
|
Add Access Control List to MPU ports (#765)
This PR adds Access Control to kernel objects on a per task basis to MPU
ports. The following needs to be defined in the `FreeRTOSConfig.h` to
enable this feature:
```c
#define configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 0
#define configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST 1
```
This PR adds the following new APIs:
```c
void vGrantAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToRevokeAccess );
```
An unprivileged task by default has access to itself only and no other
kernel object. The application writer needs to explicitly grant an
unprivileged task access to all the kernel objects it needs. The best
place to do that is before starting the scheduler when all the kernel
objects are created.
For example, let's say an unprivileged tasks needs access to a queue and
an event group, the application writer needs to do the following:
```c
vGrantAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vGrantAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
The application writer MUST revoke all the accesses before deleting a
task. Failing to do so will result in undefined behavior. In the above
example, the application writer needs to make the following 2 calls
before deleting the task:
```c
vRevokeAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
1 year ago
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xAccessGranted = pdTRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if( ( xTaskMpuSettings->ulAccessControlList[ ulAccessControlListEntryIndex ] & ( 1U << ulAccessControlListEntryBit ) ) != 0 )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xAccessGranted = pdTRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
Add Access Control List to MPU ports (#765)
This PR adds Access Control to kernel objects on a per task basis to MPU
ports. The following needs to be defined in the `FreeRTOSConfig.h` to
enable this feature:
```c
#define configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 0
#define configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST 1
```
This PR adds the following new APIs:
```c
void vGrantAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToRevokeAccess );
```
An unprivileged task by default has access to itself only and no other
kernel object. The application writer needs to explicitly grant an
unprivileged task access to all the kernel objects it needs. The best
place to do that is before starting the scheduler when all the kernel
objects are created.
For example, let's say an unprivileged tasks needs access to a queue and
an event group, the application writer needs to do the following:
```c
vGrantAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vGrantAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
The application writer MUST revoke all the accesses before deleting a
task. Failing to do so will result in undefined behavior. In the above
example, the application writer needs to make the following 2 calls
before deleting the task:
```c
vRevokeAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
1 year ago
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}
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return xAccessGranted;
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}
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#else /* #if ( configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST == 1 ) */
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BaseType_t xPortIsAuthorizedToAccessKernelObject( int32_t lInternalIndexOfKernelObject ) /* PRIVILEGED_FUNCTION */
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{
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( void ) lInternalIndexOfKernelObject;
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/* If Access Control List feature is not used, all the tasks have
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* access to all the kernel objects. */
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return pdTRUE;
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}
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#endif /* #if ( configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST == 1 ) */
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#endif /* #if ( configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 == 0 ) */
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/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
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