mirror of https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git
add letsencrypt to Gitea (#4189)
Fluf
7 years ago
committed by
techknowlogick
parent
6c1a31ffaa
commit
b82c14b3d2
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,962 @@
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// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// Package autocert provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt
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// and any other ACME-based CA.
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//
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// This package is a work in progress and makes no API stability promises.
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package autocert
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/pem"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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mathrand "math/rand"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"path"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
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)
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// createCertRetryAfter is how much time to wait before removing a failed state
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// entry due to an unsuccessful createCert call.
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// This is a variable instead of a const for testing.
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// TODO: Consider making it configurable or an exp backoff?
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var createCertRetryAfter = time.Minute
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// pseudoRand is safe for concurrent use.
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var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand
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func init() {
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src := mathrand.NewSource(timeNow().UnixNano())
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pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)}
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}
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// AcceptTOS is a Manager.Prompt function that always returns true to
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// indicate acceptance of the CA's Terms of Service during account
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// registration.
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func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true }
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// HostPolicy specifies which host names the Manager is allowed to respond to.
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// It returns a non-nil error if the host should be rejected.
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// The returned error is accessible via tls.Conn.Handshake and its callers.
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// See Manager's HostPolicy field and GetCertificate method docs for more details.
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type HostPolicy func(ctx context.Context, host string) error
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// HostWhitelist returns a policy where only the specified host names are allowed.
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// Only exact matches are currently supported. Subdomains, regexp or wildcard
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// will not match.
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func HostWhitelist(hosts ...string) HostPolicy {
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whitelist := make(map[string]bool, len(hosts))
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for _, h := range hosts {
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whitelist[h] = true
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}
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return func(_ context.Context, host string) error {
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if !whitelist[host] {
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return errors.New("acme/autocert: host not configured")
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}
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return nil
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}
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}
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// defaultHostPolicy is used when Manager.HostPolicy is not set.
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func defaultHostPolicy(context.Context, string) error {
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return nil
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}
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// Manager is a stateful certificate manager built on top of acme.Client.
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// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically using "tls-sni-01",
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// "tls-sni-02" and "http-01" challenge types, as well as providing them
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// to a TLS server via tls.Config.
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//
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// You must specify a cache implementation, such as DirCache,
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// to reuse obtained certificates across program restarts.
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// Otherwise your server is very likely to exceed the certificate
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// issuer's request rate limits.
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type Manager struct {
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// Prompt specifies a callback function to conditionally accept a CA's Terms of Service (TOS).
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// The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's TOS.
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// If so, Manager calls Prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report
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// whether the caller agrees to the terms.
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//
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// To always accept the terms, the callers can use AcceptTOS.
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Prompt func(tosURL string) bool
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// Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates.
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// If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of the Manager.
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//
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// Manager passes the Cache certificates data encoded in PEM, with private/public
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// parts combined in a single Cache.Put call, private key first.
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Cache Cache
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// HostPolicy controls which domains the Manager will attempt
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// to retrieve new certificates for. It does not affect cached certs.
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//
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// If non-nil, HostPolicy is called before requesting a new cert.
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// If nil, all hosts are currently allowed. This is not recommended,
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// as it opens a potential attack where clients connect to a server
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// by IP address and pretend to be asking for an incorrect host name.
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// Manager will attempt to obtain a certificate for that host, incorrectly,
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// eventually reaching the CA's rate limit for certificate requests
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// and making it impossible to obtain actual certificates.
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//
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// See GetCertificate for more details.
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HostPolicy HostPolicy
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// RenewBefore optionally specifies how early certificates should
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// be renewed before they expire.
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//
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// If zero, they're renewed 30 days before expiration.
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RenewBefore time.Duration
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// Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration
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// and requesting new certificates.
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// If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL
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// directory endpoint and a newly-generated ECDSA P-256 key.
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//
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// Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect.
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Client *acme.Client
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// Email optionally specifies a contact email address.
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// This is used by CAs, such as Let's Encrypt, to notify about problems
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// with issued certificates.
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//
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// If the Client's account key is already registered, Email is not used.
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Email string
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// ForceRSA makes the Manager generate certificates with 2048-bit RSA keys.
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//
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// If false, a default is used. Currently the default
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// is EC-based keys using the P-256 curve.
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ForceRSA bool
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clientMu sync.Mutex
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client *acme.Client // initialized by acmeClient method
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stateMu sync.Mutex
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state map[string]*certState // keyed by domain name
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// renewal tracks the set of domains currently running renewal timers.
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// It is keyed by domain name.
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renewalMu sync.Mutex
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renewal map[string]*domainRenewal
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// tokensMu guards the rest of the fields: tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens.
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tokensMu sync.RWMutex
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// tryHTTP01 indicates whether the Manager should try "http-01" challenge type
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// during the authorization flow.
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tryHTTP01 bool
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// httpTokens contains response body values for http-01 challenges
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// and is keyed by the URL path at which a challenge response is expected
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// to be provisioned.
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// The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow.
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httpTokens map[string][]byte
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// certTokens contains temporary certificates for tls-sni challenges
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// and is keyed by token domain name, which matches server name of ClientHello.
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// Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix.
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// The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow.
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certTokens map[string]*tls.Certificate
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}
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// GetCertificate implements the tls.Config.GetCertificate hook.
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// It provides a TLS certificate for hello.ServerName host, including answering
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// *.acme.invalid (TLS-SNI) challenges. All other fields of hello are ignored.
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//
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// If m.HostPolicy is non-nil, GetCertificate calls the policy before requesting
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// a new cert. A non-nil error returned from m.HostPolicy halts TLS negotiation.
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// The error is propagated back to the caller of GetCertificate and is user-visible.
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// This does not affect cached certs. See HostPolicy field description for more details.
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func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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if m.Prompt == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: Manager.Prompt not set")
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}
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name := hello.ServerName
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if name == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing server name")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(strings.Trim(name, "."), ".") {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name component count invalid")
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}
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if strings.ContainsAny(name, `/\`) {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name contains invalid character")
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}
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// In the worst-case scenario, the timeout needs to account for caching, host policy,
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// domain ownership verification and certificate issuance.
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
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defer cancel()
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// check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI challenge
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if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".acme.invalid") {
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m.tokensMu.RLock()
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defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
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if cert := m.certTokens[name]; cert != nil {
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return cert, nil
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}
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if cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name); err == nil {
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return cert, nil
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}
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// TODO: cache error results?
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: no token cert for %q", name)
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}
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// regular domain
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name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".") // golang.org/issue/18114
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cert, err := m.cert(ctx, name)
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if err == nil {
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return cert, nil
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}
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if err != ErrCacheMiss {
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return nil, err
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}
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// first-time
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if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, name); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, name)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert)
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return cert, nil
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}
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// HTTPHandler configures the Manager to provision ACME "http-01" challenge responses.
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// It returns an http.Handler that responds to the challenges and must be
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// running on port 80. If it receives a request that is not an ACME challenge,
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// it delegates the request to the optional fallback handler.
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//
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// If fallback is nil, the returned handler redirects all GET and HEAD requests
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// to the default TLS port 443 with 302 Found status code, preserving the original
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// request path and query. It responds with 400 Bad Request to all other HTTP methods.
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// The fallback is not protected by the optional HostPolicy.
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//
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// Because the fallback handler is run with unencrypted port 80 requests,
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// the fallback should not serve TLS-only requests.
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//
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// If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use TLS SNI
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// challenges for domain verification.
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func (m *Manager) HTTPHandler(fallback http.Handler) http.Handler {
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m.tokensMu.Lock()
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defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
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m.tryHTTP01 = true
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if fallback == nil {
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fallback = http.HandlerFunc(handleHTTPRedirect)
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}
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/acme-challenge/") {
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fallback.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// A reasonable context timeout for cache and host policy only,
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// because we don't wait for a new certificate issuance here.
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), time.Minute)
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defer cancel()
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if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, r.Host); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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data, err := m.httpToken(ctx, r.URL.Path)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusNotFound)
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return
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}
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w.Write(data)
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})
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}
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func handleHTTPRedirect(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != "GET" && r.Method != "HEAD" {
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http.Error(w, "Use HTTPS", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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target := "https://" + stripPort(r.Host) + r.URL.RequestURI()
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http.Redirect(w, r, target, http.StatusFound)
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}
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func stripPort(hostport string) string {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostport)
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if err != nil {
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return hostport
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}
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return net.JoinHostPort(host, "443")
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}
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// cert returns an existing certificate either from m.state or cache.
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// If a certificate is found in cache but not in m.state, the latter will be filled
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// with the cached value.
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func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, name string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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m.stateMu.Lock()
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if s, ok := m.state[name]; ok {
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m.stateMu.Unlock()
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s.RLock()
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defer s.RUnlock()
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return s.tlscert()
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}
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defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
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cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
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if !ok {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key cannot sign")
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}
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if m.state == nil {
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m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
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}
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s := &certState{
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key: signer,
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cert: cert.Certificate,
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leaf: cert.Leaf,
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}
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m.state[name] = s
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go m.renew(name, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
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return cert, nil
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}
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// cacheGet always returns a valid certificate, or an error otherwise.
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// If a cached certficate exists but is not valid, ErrCacheMiss is returned.
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func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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if m.Cache == nil {
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return nil, ErrCacheMiss
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}
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data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, domain)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// private
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priv, pub := pem.Decode(data)
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if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
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return nil, ErrCacheMiss
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}
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privKey, err := parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// public
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var pubDER [][]byte
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for len(pub) > 0 {
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var b *pem.Block
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b, pub = pem.Decode(pub)
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if b == nil {
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break
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}
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pubDER = append(pubDER, b.Bytes)
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}
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if len(pub) > 0 {
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// Leftover content not consumed by pem.Decode. Corrupt. Ignore.
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return nil, ErrCacheMiss
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}
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// verify and create TLS cert
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leaf, err := validCert(domain, pubDER, privKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, ErrCacheMiss
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}
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tlscert := &tls.Certificate{
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Certificate: pubDER,
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PrivateKey: privKey,
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Leaf: leaf,
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}
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return tlscert, nil
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}
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func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, domain string, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error {
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if m.Cache == nil {
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return nil
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}
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// contains PEM-encoded data
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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// private
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switch key := tlscert.PrivateKey.(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
|
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if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
|
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return err
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}
|
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case *rsa.PrivateKey:
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b := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)
|
||||
pb := &pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
|
||||
if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type")
|
||||
}
|
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|
||||
// public
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for _, b := range tlscert.Certificate {
|
||||
pb := &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: b}
|
||||
if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return m.Cache.Put(ctx, domain, buf.Bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
|
||||
b, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
pb := &pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
|
||||
return pem.Encode(w, pb)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// createCert starts the domain ownership verification and returns a certificate
|
||||
// for that domain upon success.
|
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//
|
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// If the domain is already being verified, it waits for the existing verification to complete.
|
||||
// Either way, createCert blocks for the duration of the whole process.
|
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func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
|
||||
// TODO: maybe rewrite this whole piece using sync.Once
|
||||
state, err := m.certState(domain)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// state may exist if another goroutine is already working on it
|
||||
// in which case just wait for it to finish
|
||||
if !state.locked {
|
||||
state.RLock()
|
||||
defer state.RUnlock()
|
||||
return state.tlscert()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We are the first; state is locked.
|
||||
// Unblock the readers when domain ownership is verified
|
||||
// and we got the cert or the process failed.
|
||||
defer state.Unlock()
|
||||
state.locked = false
|
||||
|
||||
der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, domain)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Remove the failed state after some time,
|
||||
// making the manager call createCert again on the following TLS hello.
|
||||
time.AfterFunc(createCertRetryAfter, func() {
|
||||
defer testDidRemoveState(domain)
|
||||
m.stateMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
|
||||
// Verify the state hasn't changed and it's still invalid
|
||||
// before deleting.
|
||||
s, ok := m.state[domain]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := validCert(domain, s.cert, s.key); err == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
delete(m.state, domain)
|
||||
})
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
state.cert = der
|
||||
state.leaf = leaf
|
||||
go m.renew(domain, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
|
||||
return state.tlscert()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// certState returns a new or existing certState.
|
||||
// If a new certState is returned, state.exist is false and the state is locked.
|
||||
// The returned error is non-nil only in the case where a new state could not be created.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) {
|
||||
m.stateMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if m.state == nil {
|
||||
m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// existing state
|
||||
if state, ok := m.state[domain]; ok {
|
||||
return state, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// new locked state
|
||||
var (
|
||||
err error
|
||||
key crypto.Signer
|
||||
)
|
||||
if m.ForceRSA {
|
||||
key, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
state := &certState{
|
||||
key: key,
|
||||
locked: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
state.Lock() // will be unlocked by m.certState caller
|
||||
m.state[domain] = state
|
||||
return state, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// authorizedCert starts the domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success.
|
||||
// The key argument is the certificate private key.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, domain string) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
|
||||
client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := m.verify(ctx, client, domain); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
csr, err := certRequest(key, domain)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
der, _, err = client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
leaf, err = validCert(domain, der, key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return der, leaf, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// verify runs the identifier (domain) authorization flow
|
||||
// using each applicable ACME challenge type.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) error {
|
||||
// The list of challenge types we'll try to fulfill
|
||||
// in this specific order.
|
||||
challengeTypes := []string{"tls-sni-02", "tls-sni-01"}
|
||||
m.tokensMu.RLock()
|
||||
if m.tryHTTP01 {
|
||||
challengeTypes = append(challengeTypes, "http-01")
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
|
||||
|
||||
var nextTyp int // challengeType index of the next challenge type to try
|
||||
for {
|
||||
// Start domain authorization and get the challenge.
|
||||
authz, err := client.Authorize(ctx, domain)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// No point in accepting challenges if the authorization status
|
||||
// is in a final state.
|
||||
switch authz.Status {
|
||||
case acme.StatusValid:
|
||||
return nil // already authorized
|
||||
case acme.StatusInvalid:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid authorization %q", authz.URI)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Pick the next preferred challenge.
|
||||
var chal *acme.Challenge
|
||||
for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) {
|
||||
chal = pickChallenge(challengeTypes[nextTyp], authz.Challenges)
|
||||
nextTyp++
|
||||
}
|
||||
if chal == nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unable to authorize %q; tried %q", domain, challengeTypes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A challenge is fulfilled and accepted: wait for the CA to validate.
|
||||
if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI); err == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fulfill provisions a response to the challenge chal.
|
||||
// The cleanup is non-nil only if provisioning succeeded.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge) (cleanup func(), err error) {
|
||||
switch chal.Type {
|
||||
case "tls-sni-01":
|
||||
cert, name, err := client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(chal.Token)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.putCertToken(ctx, name, &cert)
|
||||
return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(name) }, nil
|
||||
case "tls-sni-02":
|
||||
cert, name, err := client.TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(chal.Token)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.putCertToken(ctx, name, &cert)
|
||||
return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(name) }, nil
|
||||
case "http-01":
|
||||
resp, err := client.HTTP01ChallengeResponse(chal.Token)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
p := client.HTTP01ChallengePath(chal.Token)
|
||||
m.putHTTPToken(ctx, p, resp)
|
||||
return func() { go m.deleteHTTPToken(p) }, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unknown challenge type %q", chal.Type)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge {
|
||||
for _, c := range chal {
|
||||
if c.Type == typ {
|
||||
return c
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// putCertToken stores the cert under the named key in both m.certTokens map
|
||||
// and m.Cache.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certificate) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if m.certTokens == nil {
|
||||
m.certTokens = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate)
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.certTokens[name] = cert
|
||||
m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// deleteCertToken removes the token certificate for the specified domain name
|
||||
// from both m.certTokens map and m.Cache.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
|
||||
delete(m.certTokens, name)
|
||||
if m.Cache != nil {
|
||||
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// httpToken retrieves an existing http-01 token value from an in-memory map
|
||||
// or the optional cache.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) httpToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath string) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.RLock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if v, ok := m.httpTokens[tokenPath]; ok {
|
||||
return v, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if m.Cache == nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: no token at %q", tokenPath)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return m.Cache.Get(ctx, httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// putHTTPToken stores an http-01 token value using tokenPath as key
|
||||
// in both in-memory map and the optional Cache.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It ignores any error returned from Cache.Put.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) putHTTPToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath, val string) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if m.httpTokens == nil {
|
||||
m.httpTokens = make(map[string][]byte)
|
||||
}
|
||||
b := []byte(val)
|
||||
m.httpTokens[tokenPath] = b
|
||||
if m.Cache != nil {
|
||||
m.Cache.Put(ctx, httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath), b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// deleteHTTPToken removes an http-01 token value from both in-memory map
|
||||
// and the optional Cache, ignoring any error returned from the latter.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If m.Cache is non-nil, it blocks until Cache.Delete returns without a timeout.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) deleteHTTPToken(tokenPath string) {
|
||||
m.tokensMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
|
||||
delete(m.httpTokens, tokenPath)
|
||||
if m.Cache != nil {
|
||||
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// httpTokenCacheKey returns a key at which an http-01 token value may be stored
|
||||
// in the Manager's optional Cache.
|
||||
func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string {
|
||||
return "http-01-" + path.Base(tokenPath)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// renew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The loop is scheduled in two cases:
|
||||
// - a cert was fetched from cache for the first time (wasn't in m.state)
|
||||
// - a new cert was created by m.createCert
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The key argument is a certificate private key.
|
||||
// The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter).
|
||||
func (m *Manager) renew(domain string, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
|
||||
m.renewalMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if m.renewal[domain] != nil {
|
||||
// another goroutine is already on it
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if m.renewal == nil {
|
||||
m.renewal = make(map[string]*domainRenewal)
|
||||
}
|
||||
dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, domain: domain, key: key}
|
||||
m.renewal[domain] = dr
|
||||
dr.start(exp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// stopRenew stops all currently running cert renewal timers.
|
||||
// The timers are not restarted during the lifetime of the Manager.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) stopRenew() {
|
||||
m.renewalMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
|
||||
for name, dr := range m.renewal {
|
||||
delete(m.renewal, name)
|
||||
dr.stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) {
|
||||
const keyName = "acme_account.key"
|
||||
|
||||
genKey := func() (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
|
||||
return ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if m.Cache == nil {
|
||||
return genKey()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, keyName)
|
||||
if err == ErrCacheMiss {
|
||||
key, err := genKey()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := m.Cache.Put(ctx, keyName, buf.Bytes()); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
priv, _ := pem.Decode(data)
|
||||
if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: invalid account key found in cache")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) {
|
||||
m.clientMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer m.clientMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if m.client != nil {
|
||||
return m.client, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
client := m.Client
|
||||
if client == nil {
|
||||
client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: acme.LetsEncryptURL}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if client.Key == nil {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
client.Key, err = m.accountKey(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
var contact []string
|
||||
if m.Email != "" {
|
||||
contact = []string{"mailto:" + m.Email}
|
||||
}
|
||||
a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact}
|
||||
_, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt)
|
||||
if ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error); err == nil || ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict {
|
||||
// conflict indicates the key is already registered
|
||||
m.client = client
|
||||
err = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return m.client, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy {
|
||||
if m.HostPolicy != nil {
|
||||
return m.HostPolicy
|
||||
}
|
||||
return defaultHostPolicy
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Manager) renewBefore() time.Duration {
|
||||
if m.RenewBefore > renewJitter {
|
||||
return m.RenewBefore
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 720 * time.Hour // 30 days
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// certState is ready when its mutex is unlocked for reading.
|
||||
type certState struct {
|
||||
sync.RWMutex
|
||||
locked bool // locked for read/write
|
||||
key crypto.Signer // private key for cert
|
||||
cert [][]byte // DER encoding
|
||||
leaf *x509.Certificate // parsed cert[0]; always non-nil if cert != nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// tlscert creates a tls.Certificate from s.key and s.cert.
|
||||
// Callers should wrap it in s.RLock() and s.RUnlock().
|
||||
func (s *certState) tlscert() (*tls.Certificate, error) {
|
||||
if s.key == nil {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing signer")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(s.cert) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing certificate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &tls.Certificate{
|
||||
PrivateKey: s.key,
|
||||
Certificate: s.cert,
|
||||
Leaf: s.leaf,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// certRequest creates a certificate request for the given common name cn
|
||||
// and optional SANs.
|
||||
func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, san ...string) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
req := &x509.CertificateRequest{
|
||||
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
|
||||
DNSNames: san,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, req, key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
|
||||
// PKCS#1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS#8 keys.
|
||||
// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Inspired by parsePrivateKey in crypto/tls/tls.go.
|
||||
func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.Signer, error) {
|
||||
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
||||
switch key := key.(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: failed to parse private key")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf, der[0],
|
||||
// corresponds to the private key, as well as the domain match and expiration dates.
|
||||
// It doesn't do any revocation checking.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned value is the verified leaf cert.
|
||||
func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
|
||||
// parse public part(s)
|
||||
var n int
|
||||
for _, b := range der {
|
||||
n += len(b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub := make([]byte, n)
|
||||
n = 0
|
||||
for _, b := range der {
|
||||
n += copy(pub[n:], b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificates(pub)
|
||||
if len(x509Cert) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no public key found")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// verify the leaf is not expired and matches the domain name
|
||||
leaf = x509Cert[0]
|
||||
now := timeNow()
|
||||
if now.Before(leaf.NotBefore) {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate is not valid yet")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if now.After(leaf.NotAfter) {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: expired certificate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(domain); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key
|
||||
switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
prv, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pub.N.Cmp(prv.N) != 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
|
||||
}
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
prv, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pub.X.Cmp(prv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(prv.Y) != 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown public key algorithm")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return leaf, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type lockedMathRand struct {
|
||||
sync.Mutex
|
||||
rnd *mathrand.Rand
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *lockedMathRand) int63n(max int64) int64 {
|
||||
r.Lock()
|
||||
n := r.rnd.Int63n(max)
|
||||
r.Unlock()
|
||||
return n
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// For easier testing.
|
||||
var (
|
||||
timeNow = time.Now
|
||||
|
||||
// Called when a state is removed.
|
||||
testDidRemoveState = func(domain string) {}
|
||||
)
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package autocert
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"io/ioutil"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrCacheMiss is returned when a certificate is not found in cache.
|
||||
var ErrCacheMiss = errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate cache miss")
|
||||
|
||||
// Cache is used by Manager to store and retrieve previously obtained certificates
|
||||
// as opaque data.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The key argument of the methods refers to a domain name but need not be an FQDN.
|
||||
// Cache implementations should not rely on the key naming pattern.
|
||||
type Cache interface {
|
||||
// Get returns a certificate data for the specified key.
|
||||
// If there's no such key, Get returns ErrCacheMiss.
|
||||
Get(ctx context.Context, key string) ([]byte, error)
|
||||
|
||||
// Put stores the data in the cache under the specified key.
|
||||
// Underlying implementations may use any data storage format,
|
||||
// as long as the reverse operation, Get, results in the original data.
|
||||
Put(ctx context.Context, key string, data []byte) error
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete removes a certificate data from the cache under the specified key.
|
||||
// If there's no such key in the cache, Delete returns nil.
|
||||
Delete(ctx context.Context, key string) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DirCache implements Cache using a directory on the local filesystem.
|
||||
// If the directory does not exist, it will be created with 0700 permissions.
|
||||
type DirCache string
|
||||
|
||||
// Get reads a certificate data from the specified file name.
|
||||
func (d DirCache) Get(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
name = filepath.Join(string(d), name)
|
||||
var (
|
||||
data []byte
|
||||
err error
|
||||
done = make(chan struct{})
|
||||
)
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
data, err = ioutil.ReadFile(name)
|
||||
close(done)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
return nil, ctx.Err()
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
}
|
||||
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
||||
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
|
||||
}
|
||||
return data, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Put writes the certificate data to the specified file name.
|
||||
// The file will be created with 0600 permissions.
|
||||
func (d DirCache) Put(ctx context.Context, name string, data []byte) error {
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll(string(d), 0700); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
done := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
defer close(done)
|
||||
var tmp string
|
||||
if tmp, err = d.writeTempFile(name, data); err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
// Don't overwrite the file if the context was canceled.
|
||||
default:
|
||||
newName := filepath.Join(string(d), name)
|
||||
err = os.Rename(tmp, newName)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
return ctx.Err()
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
}
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete removes the specified file name.
|
||||
func (d DirCache) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error {
|
||||
name = filepath.Join(string(d), name)
|
||||
var (
|
||||
err error
|
||||
done = make(chan struct{})
|
||||
)
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
err = os.Remove(name)
|
||||
close(done)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
return ctx.Err()
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// writeTempFile writes b to a temporary file, closes the file and returns its path.
|
||||
func (d DirCache) writeTempFile(prefix string, b []byte) (string, error) {
|
||||
// TempFile uses 0600 permissions
|
||||
f, err := ioutil.TempFile(string(d), prefix)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := f.Write(b); err != nil {
|
||||
f.Close()
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return f.Name(), f.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package autocert
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/tls"
|
||||
"log"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// NewListener returns a net.Listener that listens on the standard TLS
|
||||
// port (443) on all interfaces and returns *tls.Conn connections with
|
||||
// LetsEncrypt certificates for the provided domain or domains.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It enables one-line HTTPS servers:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// log.Fatal(http.Serve(autocert.NewListener("example.com"), handler))
|
||||
//
|
||||
// NewListener is a convenience function for a common configuration.
|
||||
// More complex or custom configurations can use the autocert.Manager
|
||||
// type instead.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Use of this function implies acceptance of the LetsEncrypt Terms of
|
||||
// Service. If domains is not empty, the provided domains are passed
|
||||
// to HostWhitelist. If domains is empty, the listener will do
|
||||
// LetsEncrypt challenges for any requested domain, which is not
|
||||
// recommended.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Certificates are cached in a "golang-autocert" directory under an
|
||||
// operating system-specific cache or temp directory. This may not
|
||||
// be suitable for servers spanning multiple machines.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned listener uses a *tls.Config that enables HTTP/2, and
|
||||
// should only be used with servers that support HTTP/2.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned Listener also enables TCP keep-alives on the accepted
|
||||
// connections. The returned *tls.Conn are returned before their TLS
|
||||
// handshake has completed.
|
||||
func NewListener(domains ...string) net.Listener {
|
||||
m := &Manager{
|
||||
Prompt: AcceptTOS,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(domains) > 0 {
|
||||
m.HostPolicy = HostWhitelist(domains...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
dir := cacheDir()
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
|
||||
log.Printf("warning: autocert.NewListener not using a cache: %v", err)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
m.Cache = DirCache(dir)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return m.Listener()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Listener listens on the standard TLS port (443) on all interfaces
|
||||
// and returns a net.Listener returning *tls.Conn connections.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned listener uses a *tls.Config that enables HTTP/2, and
|
||||
// should only be used with servers that support HTTP/2.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned Listener also enables TCP keep-alives on the accepted
|
||||
// connections. The returned *tls.Conn are returned before their TLS
|
||||
// handshake has completed.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Unlike NewListener, it is the caller's responsibility to initialize
|
||||
// the Manager m's Prompt, Cache, HostPolicy, and other desired options.
|
||||
func (m *Manager) Listener() net.Listener {
|
||||
ln := &listener{
|
||||
m: m,
|
||||
conf: &tls.Config{
|
||||
GetCertificate: m.GetCertificate, // bonus: panic on nil m
|
||||
NextProtos: []string{"h2", "http/1.1"}, // Enable HTTP/2
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
ln.tcpListener, ln.tcpListenErr = net.Listen("tcp", ":443")
|
||||
return ln
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type listener struct {
|
||||
m *Manager
|
||||
conf *tls.Config
|
||||
|
||||
tcpListener net.Listener
|
||||
tcpListenErr error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ln *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
|
||||
if ln.tcpListenErr != nil {
|
||||
return nil, ln.tcpListenErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
conn, err := ln.tcpListener.Accept()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
tcpConn := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
|
||||
|
||||
// Because Listener is a convenience function, help out with
|
||||
// this too. This is not possible for the caller to set once
|
||||
// we return a *tcp.Conn wrapping an inaccessible net.Conn.
|
||||
// If callers don't want this, they can do things the manual
|
||||
// way and tweak as needed. But this is what net/http does
|
||||
// itself, so copy that. If net/http changes, we can change
|
||||
// here too.
|
||||
tcpConn.SetKeepAlive(true)
|
||||
tcpConn.SetKeepAlivePeriod(3 * time.Minute)
|
||||
|
||||
return tls.Server(tcpConn, ln.conf), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ln *listener) Addr() net.Addr {
|
||||
if ln.tcpListener != nil {
|
||||
return ln.tcpListener.Addr()
|
||||
}
|
||||
// net.Listen failed. Return something non-nil in case callers
|
||||
// call Addr before Accept:
|
||||
return &net.TCPAddr{IP: net.IP{0, 0, 0, 0}, Port: 443}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ln *listener) Close() error {
|
||||
if ln.tcpListenErr != nil {
|
||||
return ln.tcpListenErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ln.tcpListener.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func homeDir() string {
|
||||
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
|
||||
return os.Getenv("HOMEDRIVE") + os.Getenv("HOMEPATH")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h := os.Getenv("HOME"); h != "" {
|
||||
return h
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "/"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func cacheDir() string {
|
||||
const base = "golang-autocert"
|
||||
switch runtime.GOOS {
|
||||
case "darwin":
|
||||
return filepath.Join(homeDir(), "Library", "Caches", base)
|
||||
case "windows":
|
||||
for _, ev := range []string{"APPDATA", "CSIDL_APPDATA", "TEMP", "TMP"} {
|
||||
if v := os.Getenv(ev); v != "" {
|
||||
return filepath.Join(v, base)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Worst case:
|
||||
return filepath.Join(homeDir(), base)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if xdg := os.Getenv("XDG_CACHE_HOME"); xdg != "" {
|
||||
return filepath.Join(xdg, base)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return filepath.Join(homeDir(), ".cache", base)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package autocert
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// renewJitter is the maximum deviation from Manager.RenewBefore.
|
||||
const renewJitter = time.Hour
|
||||
|
||||
// domainRenewal tracks the state used by the periodic timers
|
||||
// renewing a single domain's cert.
|
||||
type domainRenewal struct {
|
||||
m *Manager
|
||||
domain string
|
||||
key crypto.Signer
|
||||
|
||||
timerMu sync.Mutex
|
||||
timer *time.Timer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// start starts a cert renewal timer at the time
|
||||
// defined by the certificate expiration time exp.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If the timer is already started, calling start is a noop.
|
||||
func (dr *domainRenewal) start(exp time.Time) {
|
||||
dr.timerMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if dr.timer != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(dr.next(exp), dr.renew)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// stop stops the cert renewal timer.
|
||||
// If the timer is already stopped, calling stop is a noop.
|
||||
func (dr *domainRenewal) stop() {
|
||||
dr.timerMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if dr.timer == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
dr.timer.Stop()
|
||||
dr.timer = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// renew is called periodically by a timer.
|
||||
// The first renew call is kicked off by dr.start.
|
||||
func (dr *domainRenewal) renew() {
|
||||
dr.timerMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
|
||||
if dr.timer == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Minute)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
// TODO: rotate dr.key at some point?
|
||||
next, err := dr.do(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
next = renewJitter / 2
|
||||
next += time.Duration(pseudoRand.int63n(int64(next)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(next, dr.renew)
|
||||
testDidRenewLoop(next, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// updateState locks and replaces the relevant Manager.state item with the given
|
||||
// state. It additionally updates dr.key with the given state's key.
|
||||
func (dr *domainRenewal) updateState(state *certState) {
|
||||
dr.m.stateMu.Lock()
|
||||
defer dr.m.stateMu.Unlock()
|
||||
dr.key = state.key
|
||||
dr.m.state[dr.domain] = state
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// do is similar to Manager.createCert but it doesn't lock a Manager.state item.
|
||||
// Instead, it requests a new certificate independently and, upon success,
|
||||
// replaces dr.m.state item with a new one and updates cache for the given domain.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It may lock and update the Manager.state if the expiration date of the currently
|
||||
// cached cert is far enough in the future.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The returned value is a time interval after which the renewal should occur again.
|
||||
func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) {
|
||||
// a race is likely unavoidable in a distributed environment
|
||||
// but we try nonetheless
|
||||
if tlscert, err := dr.m.cacheGet(ctx, dr.domain); err == nil {
|
||||
next := dr.next(tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter)
|
||||
if next > dr.m.renewBefore()+renewJitter {
|
||||
signer, ok := tlscert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
|
||||
if ok {
|
||||
state := &certState{
|
||||
key: signer,
|
||||
cert: tlscert.Certificate,
|
||||
leaf: tlscert.Leaf,
|
||||
}
|
||||
dr.updateState(state)
|
||||
return next, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
der, leaf, err := dr.m.authorizedCert(ctx, dr.key, dr.domain)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return 0, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
state := &certState{
|
||||
key: dr.key,
|
||||
cert: der,
|
||||
leaf: leaf,
|
||||
}
|
||||
tlscert, err := state.tlscert()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return 0, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := dr.m.cachePut(ctx, dr.domain, tlscert); err != nil {
|
||||
return 0, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
dr.updateState(state)
|
||||
return dr.next(leaf.NotAfter), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (dr *domainRenewal) next(expiry time.Time) time.Duration {
|
||||
d := expiry.Sub(timeNow()) - dr.m.renewBefore()
|
||||
// add a bit of randomness to renew deadline
|
||||
n := pseudoRand.int63n(int64(renewJitter))
|
||||
d -= time.Duration(n)
|
||||
if d < 0 {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
return d
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var testDidRenewLoop = func(next time.Duration, err error) {}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package acme
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
_ "crypto/sha512" // need for EC keys
|
||||
"encoding/base64"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"math/big"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// jwsEncodeJSON signs claimset using provided key and a nonce.
|
||||
// The result is serialized in JSON format.
|
||||
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-7.
|
||||
func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, nonce string) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
jwk, err := jwkEncode(key.Public())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
alg, sha := jwsHasher(key)
|
||||
if alg == "" || !sha.Available() {
|
||||
return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
phead := fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"jwk":%s,"nonce":%q}`, alg, jwk, nonce)
|
||||
phead = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phead))
|
||||
cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs)
|
||||
hash := sha.New()
|
||||
hash.Write([]byte(phead + "." + payload))
|
||||
sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, hash.Sum(nil))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
enc := struct {
|
||||
Protected string `json:"protected"`
|
||||
Payload string `json:"payload"`
|
||||
Sig string `json:"signature"`
|
||||
}{
|
||||
Protected: phead,
|
||||
Payload: payload,
|
||||
Sig: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return json.Marshal(&enc)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// jwkEncode encodes public part of an RSA or ECDSA key into a JWK.
|
||||
// The result is also suitable for creating a JWK thumbprint.
|
||||
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517
|
||||
func jwkEncode(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
|
||||
switch pub := pub.(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.3.1
|
||||
n := pub.N
|
||||
e := big.NewInt(int64(pub.E))
|
||||
// Field order is important.
|
||||
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details.
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"e":"%s","kty":"RSA","n":"%s"}`,
|
||||
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(e.Bytes()),
|
||||
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(n.Bytes()),
|
||||
), nil
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.2.1
|
||||
p := pub.Curve.Params()
|
||||
n := p.BitSize / 8
|
||||
if p.BitSize%8 != 0 {
|
||||
n++
|
||||
}
|
||||
x := pub.X.Bytes()
|
||||
if n > len(x) {
|
||||
x = append(make([]byte, n-len(x)), x...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
y := pub.Y.Bytes()
|
||||
if n > len(y) {
|
||||
y = append(make([]byte, n-len(y)), y...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Field order is important.
|
||||
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details.
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"crv":"%s","kty":"EC","x":"%s","y":"%s"}`,
|
||||
p.Name,
|
||||
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(x),
|
||||
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(y),
|
||||
), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "", ErrUnsupportedKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// jwsSign signs the digest using the given key.
|
||||
// It returns ErrUnsupportedKey if the key type is unknown.
|
||||
// The hash is used only for RSA keys.
|
||||
func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
switch key := key.(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
|
||||
return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash)
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
|
||||
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, digest)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
rb, sb := r.Bytes(), s.Bytes()
|
||||
size := key.Params().BitSize / 8
|
||||
if size%8 > 0 {
|
||||
size++
|
||||
}
|
||||
sig := make([]byte, size*2)
|
||||
copy(sig[size-len(rb):], rb)
|
||||
copy(sig[size*2-len(sb):], sb)
|
||||
return sig, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// jwsHasher indicates suitable JWS algorithm name and a hash function
|
||||
// to use for signing a digest with the provided key.
|
||||
// It returns ("", 0) if the key is not supported.
|
||||
func jwsHasher(key crypto.Signer) (string, crypto.Hash) {
|
||||
switch key := key.(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
|
||||
return "RS256", crypto.SHA256
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
|
||||
switch key.Params().Name {
|
||||
case "P-256":
|
||||
return "ES256", crypto.SHA256
|
||||
case "P-384":
|
||||
return "ES384", crypto.SHA384
|
||||
case "P-521":
|
||||
return "ES512", crypto.SHA512
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "", 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// JWKThumbprint creates a JWK thumbprint out of pub
|
||||
// as specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638.
|
||||
func JWKThumbprint(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
|
||||
jwk, err := jwkEncode(pub)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(jwk))
|
||||
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package acme
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ACME server response statuses used to describe Authorization and Challenge states.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
StatusUnknown = "unknown"
|
||||
StatusPending = "pending"
|
||||
StatusProcessing = "processing"
|
||||
StatusValid = "valid"
|
||||
StatusInvalid = "invalid"
|
||||
StatusRevoked = "revoked"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// CRLReasonCode identifies the reason for a certificate revocation.
|
||||
type CRLReasonCode int
|
||||
|
||||
// CRL reason codes as defined in RFC 5280.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
CRLReasonUnspecified CRLReasonCode = 0
|
||||
CRLReasonKeyCompromise CRLReasonCode = 1
|
||||
CRLReasonCACompromise CRLReasonCode = 2
|
||||
CRLReasonAffiliationChanged CRLReasonCode = 3
|
||||
CRLReasonSuperseded CRLReasonCode = 4
|
||||
CRLReasonCessationOfOperation CRLReasonCode = 5
|
||||
CRLReasonCertificateHold CRLReasonCode = 6
|
||||
CRLReasonRemoveFromCRL CRLReasonCode = 8
|
||||
CRLReasonPrivilegeWithdrawn CRLReasonCode = 9
|
||||
CRLReasonAACompromise CRLReasonCode = 10
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrUnsupportedKey is returned when an unsupported key type is encountered.
|
||||
var ErrUnsupportedKey = errors.New("acme: unknown key type; only RSA and ECDSA are supported")
|
||||
|
||||
// Error is an ACME error, defined in Problem Details for HTTP APIs doc
|
||||
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-appsawg-http-problem.
|
||||
type Error struct {
|
||||
// StatusCode is The HTTP status code generated by the origin server.
|
||||
StatusCode int
|
||||
// ProblemType is a URI reference that identifies the problem type,
|
||||
// typically in a "urn:acme:error:xxx" form.
|
||||
ProblemType string
|
||||
// Detail is a human-readable explanation specific to this occurrence of the problem.
|
||||
Detail string
|
||||
// Header is the original server error response headers.
|
||||
// It may be nil.
|
||||
Header http.Header
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (e *Error) Error() string {
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf("%d %s: %s", e.StatusCode, e.ProblemType, e.Detail)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthorizationError indicates that an authorization for an identifier
|
||||
// did not succeed.
|
||||
// It contains all errors from Challenge items of the failed Authorization.
|
||||
type AuthorizationError struct {
|
||||
// URI uniquely identifies the failed Authorization.
|
||||
URI string
|
||||
|
||||
// Identifier is an AuthzID.Value of the failed Authorization.
|
||||
Identifier string
|
||||
|
||||
// Errors is a collection of non-nil error values of Challenge items
|
||||
// of the failed Authorization.
|
||||
Errors []error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *AuthorizationError) Error() string {
|
||||
e := make([]string, len(a.Errors))
|
||||
for i, err := range a.Errors {
|
||||
e[i] = err.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error for %s: %s", a.Identifier, strings.Join(e, "; "))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RateLimit reports whether err represents a rate limit error and
|
||||
// any Retry-After duration returned by the server.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// See the following for more details on rate limiting:
|
||||
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-05#section-5.6
|
||||
func RateLimit(err error) (time.Duration, bool) {
|
||||
e, ok := err.(*Error)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return 0, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Some CA implementations may return incorrect values.
|
||||
// Use case-insensitive comparison.
|
||||
if !strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(e.ProblemType), ":ratelimited") {
|
||||
return 0, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e.Header == nil {
|
||||
return 0, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return retryAfter(e.Header.Get("Retry-After"), 0), true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Account is a user account. It is associated with a private key.
|
||||
type Account struct {
|
||||
// URI is the account unique ID, which is also a URL used to retrieve
|
||||
// account data from the CA.
|
||||
URI string
|
||||
|
||||
// Contact is a slice of contact info used during registration.
|
||||
Contact []string
|
||||
|
||||
// The terms user has agreed to.
|
||||
// A value not matching CurrentTerms indicates that the user hasn't agreed
|
||||
// to the actual Terms of Service of the CA.
|
||||
AgreedTerms string
|
||||
|
||||
// Actual terms of a CA.
|
||||
CurrentTerms string
|
||||
|
||||
// Authz is the authorization URL used to initiate a new authz flow.
|
||||
Authz string
|
||||
|
||||
// Authorizations is a URI from which a list of authorizations
|
||||
// granted to this account can be fetched via a GET request.
|
||||
Authorizations string
|
||||
|
||||
// Certificates is a URI from which a list of certificates
|
||||
// issued for this account can be fetched via a GET request.
|
||||
Certificates string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Directory is ACME server discovery data.
|
||||
type Directory struct {
|
||||
// RegURL is an account endpoint URL, allowing for creating new
|
||||
// and modifying existing accounts.
|
||||
RegURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthzURL is used to initiate Identifier Authorization flow.
|
||||
AuthzURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// CertURL is a new certificate issuance endpoint URL.
|
||||
CertURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// RevokeURL is used to initiate a certificate revocation flow.
|
||||
RevokeURL string
|
||||
|
||||
// Term is a URI identifying the current terms of service.
|
||||
Terms string
|
||||
|
||||
// Website is an HTTP or HTTPS URL locating a website
|
||||
// providing more information about the ACME server.
|
||||
Website string
|
||||
|
||||
// CAA consists of lowercase hostname elements, which the ACME server
|
||||
// recognises as referring to itself for the purposes of CAA record validation
|
||||
// as defined in RFC6844.
|
||||
CAA []string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge.
|
||||
// Its Error field may be non-nil if the challenge is part of an Authorization
|
||||
// with StatusInvalid.
|
||||
type Challenge struct {
|
||||
// Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-sni-02", "dns-01".
|
||||
Type string
|
||||
|
||||
// URI is where a challenge response can be posted to.
|
||||
URI string
|
||||
|
||||
// Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge.
|
||||
Token string
|
||||
|
||||
// Status identifies the status of this challenge.
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
|
||||
// Error indicates the reason for an authorization failure
|
||||
// when this challenge was used.
|
||||
// The type of a non-nil value is *Error.
|
||||
Error error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Authorization encodes an authorization response.
|
||||
type Authorization struct {
|
||||
// URI uniquely identifies a authorization.
|
||||
URI string
|
||||
|
||||
// Status identifies the status of an authorization.
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
|
||||
// Identifier is what the account is authorized to represent.
|
||||
Identifier AuthzID
|
||||
|
||||
// Challenges that the client needs to fulfill in order to prove possession
|
||||
// of the identifier (for pending authorizations).
|
||||
// For final authorizations, the challenges that were used.
|
||||
Challenges []*Challenge
|
||||
|
||||
// A collection of sets of challenges, each of which would be sufficient
|
||||
// to prove possession of the identifier.
|
||||
// Clients must complete a set of challenges that covers at least one set.
|
||||
// Challenges are identified by their indices in the challenges array.
|
||||
// If this field is empty, the client needs to complete all challenges.
|
||||
Combinations [][]int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthzID is an identifier that an account is authorized to represent.
|
||||
type AuthzID struct {
|
||||
Type string // The type of identifier, e.g. "dns".
|
||||
Value string // The identifier itself, e.g. "example.org".
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wireAuthz is ACME JSON representation of Authorization objects.
|
||||
type wireAuthz struct {
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
Challenges []wireChallenge
|
||||
Combinations [][]int
|
||||
Identifier struct {
|
||||
Type string
|
||||
Value string
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization {
|
||||
a := &Authorization{
|
||||
URI: uri,
|
||||
Status: z.Status,
|
||||
Identifier: AuthzID{Type: z.Identifier.Type, Value: z.Identifier.Value},
|
||||
Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy
|
||||
Challenges: make([]*Challenge, len(z.Challenges)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, v := range z.Challenges {
|
||||
a.Challenges[i] = v.challenge()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return a
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (z *wireAuthz) error(uri string) *AuthorizationError {
|
||||
err := &AuthorizationError{
|
||||
URI: uri,
|
||||
Identifier: z.Identifier.Value,
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, raw := range z.Challenges {
|
||||
if raw.Error != nil {
|
||||
err.Errors = append(err.Errors, raw.Error.error(nil))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wireChallenge is ACME JSON challenge representation.
|
||||
type wireChallenge struct {
|
||||
URI string `json:"uri"`
|
||||
Type string
|
||||
Token string
|
||||
Status string
|
||||
Error *wireError
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge {
|
||||
v := &Challenge{
|
||||
URI: c.URI,
|
||||
Type: c.Type,
|
||||
Token: c.Token,
|
||||
Status: c.Status,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v.Status == "" {
|
||||
v.Status = StatusPending
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.Error != nil {
|
||||
v.Error = c.Error.error(nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wireError is a subset of fields of the Problem Details object
|
||||
// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7807#section-3.1.
|
||||
type wireError struct {
|
||||
Status int
|
||||
Type string
|
||||
Detail string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (e *wireError) error(h http.Header) *Error {
|
||||
return &Error{
|
||||
StatusCode: e.Status,
|
||||
ProblemType: e.Type,
|
||||
Detail: e.Detail,
|
||||
Header: h,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CertOption is an optional argument type for the TLSSNIxChallengeCert methods for
|
||||
// customizing a temporary certificate for TLS-SNI challenges.
|
||||
type CertOption interface {
|
||||
privateCertOpt()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WithKey creates an option holding a private/public key pair.
|
||||
// The private part signs a certificate, and the public part represents the signee.
|
||||
func WithKey(key crypto.Signer) CertOption {
|
||||
return &certOptKey{key}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type certOptKey struct {
|
||||
key crypto.Signer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (*certOptKey) privateCertOpt() {}
|
||||
|
||||
// WithTemplate creates an option for specifying a certificate template.
|
||||
// See x509.CreateCertificate for template usage details.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// In TLSSNIxChallengeCert methods, the template is also used as parent,
|
||||
// resulting in a self-signed certificate.
|
||||
// The DNSNames field of t is always overwritten for tls-sni challenge certs.
|
||||
func WithTemplate(t *x509.Certificate) CertOption {
|
||||
return (*certOptTemplate)(t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type certOptTemplate x509.Certificate
|
||||
|
||||
func (*certOptTemplate) privateCertOpt() {}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// Package ChaCha20 implements the core ChaCha20 function as specified
|
||||
// in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-2.3.
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/cipher"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// assert that *Cipher implements cipher.Stream
|
||||
var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 using a particular key
|
||||
// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface.
|
||||
type Cipher struct {
|
||||
key [8]uint32
|
||||
nonce [3]uint32
|
||||
counter uint32 // incremented after each block
|
||||
buf [64]byte // buffer for unused keystream bytes
|
||||
len int // number of unused keystream bytes at end of buf
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// New creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given key and nonce.
|
||||
// The initial counter value is set to 0.
|
||||
func New(key [8]uint32, nonce [3]uint32) *Cipher {
|
||||
return &Cipher{key: key, nonce: nonce}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the
|
||||
// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable
|
||||
// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will
|
||||
// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of
|
||||
// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher
|
||||
// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call.
|
||||
func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
// xor src with buffered keystream first
|
||||
if s.len != 0 {
|
||||
buf := s.buf[len(s.buf)-s.len:]
|
||||
if len(src) < len(buf) {
|
||||
buf = buf[:len(src)]
|
||||
}
|
||||
td, ts := dst[:len(buf)], src[:len(buf)] // BCE hint
|
||||
for i, b := range buf {
|
||||
td[i] = ts[i] ^ b
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.len -= len(buf)
|
||||
if s.len != 0 {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{} // zero the empty buffer
|
||||
src = src[len(buf):]
|
||||
dst = dst[len(buf):]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(src) == 0 {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// set up a 64-byte buffer to pad out the final block if needed
|
||||
// (hoisted out of the main loop to avoid spills)
|
||||
rem := len(src) % 64 // length of final block
|
||||
fin := len(src) - rem // index of final block
|
||||
if rem > 0 {
|
||||
copy(s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], src[fin:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// qr calculates a quarter round
|
||||
qr := func(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
|
||||
a += b
|
||||
d ^= a
|
||||
d = (d << 16) | (d >> 16)
|
||||
c += d
|
||||
b ^= c
|
||||
b = (b << 12) | (b >> 20)
|
||||
a += b
|
||||
d ^= a
|
||||
d = (d << 8) | (d >> 24)
|
||||
c += d
|
||||
b ^= c
|
||||
b = (b << 7) | (b >> 25)
|
||||
return a, b, c, d
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ChaCha20 constants
|
||||
const (
|
||||
j0 = 0x61707865
|
||||
j1 = 0x3320646e
|
||||
j2 = 0x79622d32
|
||||
j3 = 0x6b206574
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// pre-calculate most of the first round
|
||||
s1, s5, s9, s13 := qr(j1, s.key[1], s.key[5], s.nonce[0])
|
||||
s2, s6, s10, s14 := qr(j2, s.key[2], s.key[6], s.nonce[1])
|
||||
s3, s7, s11, s15 := qr(j3, s.key[3], s.key[7], s.nonce[2])
|
||||
|
||||
n := len(src)
|
||||
src, dst = src[:n:n], dst[:n:n] // BCE hint
|
||||
for i := 0; i < n; i += 64 {
|
||||
// calculate the remainder of the first round
|
||||
s0, s4, s8, s12 := qr(j0, s.key[0], s.key[4], s.counter)
|
||||
|
||||
// execute the second round
|
||||
x0, x5, x10, x15 := qr(s0, s5, s10, s15)
|
||||
x1, x6, x11, x12 := qr(s1, s6, s11, s12)
|
||||
x2, x7, x8, x13 := qr(s2, s7, s8, s13)
|
||||
x3, x4, x9, x14 := qr(s3, s4, s9, s14)
|
||||
|
||||
// execute the remaining 18 rounds
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
|
||||
x0, x4, x8, x12 = qr(x0, x4, x8, x12)
|
||||
x1, x5, x9, x13 = qr(x1, x5, x9, x13)
|
||||
x2, x6, x10, x14 = qr(x2, x6, x10, x14)
|
||||
x3, x7, x11, x15 = qr(x3, x7, x11, x15)
|
||||
|
||||
x0, x5, x10, x15 = qr(x0, x5, x10, x15)
|
||||
x1, x6, x11, x12 = qr(x1, x6, x11, x12)
|
||||
x2, x7, x8, x13 = qr(x2, x7, x8, x13)
|
||||
x3, x4, x9, x14 = qr(x3, x4, x9, x14)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
x0 += j0
|
||||
x1 += j1
|
||||
x2 += j2
|
||||
x3 += j3
|
||||
|
||||
x4 += s.key[0]
|
||||
x5 += s.key[1]
|
||||
x6 += s.key[2]
|
||||
x7 += s.key[3]
|
||||
x8 += s.key[4]
|
||||
x9 += s.key[5]
|
||||
x10 += s.key[6]
|
||||
x11 += s.key[7]
|
||||
|
||||
x12 += s.counter
|
||||
x13 += s.nonce[0]
|
||||
x14 += s.nonce[1]
|
||||
x15 += s.nonce[2]
|
||||
|
||||
// increment the counter
|
||||
s.counter += 1
|
||||
if s.counter == 0 {
|
||||
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pad to 64 bytes if needed
|
||||
in, out := src[i:], dst[i:]
|
||||
if i == fin {
|
||||
// src[fin:] has already been copied into s.buf before
|
||||
// the main loop
|
||||
in, out = s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
in, out = in[:64], out[:64] // BCE hint
|
||||
|
||||
// XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result
|
||||
xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0)
|
||||
xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1)
|
||||
xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2)
|
||||
xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3)
|
||||
xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4)
|
||||
xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5)
|
||||
xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6)
|
||||
xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7)
|
||||
xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8)
|
||||
xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9)
|
||||
xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10)
|
||||
xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11)
|
||||
xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12)
|
||||
xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13)
|
||||
xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14)
|
||||
xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// copy any trailing bytes out of the buffer and into dst
|
||||
if rem != 0 {
|
||||
s.len = 64 - rem
|
||||
copy(dst[fin:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Advance discards bytes in the key stream until the next 64 byte block
|
||||
// boundary is reached and updates the counter accordingly. If the key
|
||||
// stream is already at a block boundary no bytes will be discarded and
|
||||
// the counter will be unchanged.
|
||||
func (s *Cipher) Advance() {
|
||||
s.len -= s.len % 64
|
||||
if s.len == 0 {
|
||||
s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// XORKeyStream crypts bytes from in to out using the given key and counters.
|
||||
// In and out must overlap entirely or not at all. Counter contains the raw
|
||||
// ChaCha20 counter bytes (i.e. block counter followed by nonce).
|
||||
func XORKeyStream(out, in []byte, counter *[16]byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
s := Cipher{
|
||||
key: [8]uint32{
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]),
|
||||
},
|
||||
nonce: [3]uint32{
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[4:8]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[8:12]),
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[12:16]),
|
||||
},
|
||||
counter: binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[0:4]),
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.XORKeyStream(out, in)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found src the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses.
|
||||
const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" ||
|
||||
runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" ||
|
||||
runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" ||
|
||||
runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" ||
|
||||
runtime.GOARCH == "s390x"
|
||||
|
||||
// xor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with u and
|
||||
// places the result in little endian byte order in dst.
|
||||
func xor(dst, src []byte, u uint32) {
|
||||
_, _ = src[3], dst[3] // eliminate bounds checks
|
||||
if unaligned {
|
||||
// The compiler should optimize this code into
|
||||
// 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores.
|
||||
// TODO: delete once the compiler does a reliably
|
||||
// good job with the generic code below.
|
||||
// See issue #25111 for more details.
|
||||
v := uint32(src[0])
|
||||
v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8
|
||||
v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16
|
||||
v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24
|
||||
v ^= u
|
||||
dst[0] = byte(v)
|
||||
dst[1] = byte(v >> 8)
|
||||
dst[2] = byte(v >> 16)
|
||||
dst[3] = byte(v >> 24)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(u)
|
||||
dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(u>>8)
|
||||
dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(u>>16)
|
||||
dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(u>>24)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as
|
||||
specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf.
|
||||
|
||||
Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an
|
||||
attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a
|
||||
key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different
|
||||
messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other
|
||||
messages with the same key.
|
||||
|
||||
Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was
|
||||
used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce.
|
||||
However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified
|
||||
directly.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
package poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
|
||||
|
||||
import "crypto/subtle"
|
||||
|
||||
// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator.
|
||||
const TagSize = 16
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given
|
||||
// key.
|
||||
func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool {
|
||||
var tmp [16]byte
|
||||
Sum(&tmp, m, key)
|
||||
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
// This function is implemented in sum_amd64.s
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
var mPtr *byte
|
||||
if len(m) > 0 {
|
||||
mPtr = &m[0]
|
||||
}
|
||||
poly1305(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
#include "textflag.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2) \
|
||||
ADDQ 0(msg), h0; \
|
||||
ADCQ 8(msg), h1; \
|
||||
ADCQ $1, h2; \
|
||||
LEAQ 16(msg), msg
|
||||
|
||||
#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3) \
|
||||
MOVQ r0, AX; \
|
||||
MULQ h0; \
|
||||
MOVQ AX, t0; \
|
||||
MOVQ DX, t1; \
|
||||
MOVQ r0, AX; \
|
||||
MULQ h1; \
|
||||
ADDQ AX, t1; \
|
||||
ADCQ $0, DX; \
|
||||
MOVQ r0, t2; \
|
||||
IMULQ h2, t2; \
|
||||
ADDQ DX, t2; \
|
||||
\
|
||||
MOVQ r1, AX; \
|
||||
MULQ h0; \
|
||||
ADDQ AX, t1; \
|
||||
ADCQ $0, DX; \
|
||||
MOVQ DX, h0; \
|
||||
MOVQ r1, t3; \
|
||||
IMULQ h2, t3; \
|
||||
MOVQ r1, AX; \
|
||||
MULQ h1; \
|
||||
ADDQ AX, t2; \
|
||||
ADCQ DX, t3; \
|
||||
ADDQ h0, t2; \
|
||||
ADCQ $0, t3; \
|
||||
\
|
||||
MOVQ t0, h0; \
|
||||
MOVQ t1, h1; \
|
||||
MOVQ t2, h2; \
|
||||
ANDQ $3, h2; \
|
||||
MOVQ t2, t0; \
|
||||
ANDQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC, t0; \
|
||||
ADDQ t0, h0; \
|
||||
ADCQ t3, h1; \
|
||||
ADCQ $0, h2; \
|
||||
SHRQ $2, t3, t2; \
|
||||
SHRQ $2, t3; \
|
||||
ADDQ t2, h0; \
|
||||
ADCQ t3, h1; \
|
||||
ADCQ $0, h2
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
|
||||
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
|
||||
|
||||
// func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key)
|
||||
TEXT ·poly1305(SB), $0-32
|
||||
MOVQ out+0(FP), DI
|
||||
MOVQ m+8(FP), SI
|
||||
MOVQ mlen+16(FP), R15
|
||||
MOVQ key+24(FP), AX
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ 0(AX), R11
|
||||
MOVQ 8(AX), R12
|
||||
ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R11 // r0
|
||||
ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>+8(SB), R12 // r1
|
||||
XORQ R8, R8 // h0
|
||||
XORQ R9, R9 // h1
|
||||
XORQ R10, R10 // h2
|
||||
|
||||
CMPQ R15, $16
|
||||
JB bytes_between_0_and_15
|
||||
|
||||
loop:
|
||||
POLY1305_ADD(SI, R8, R9, R10)
|
||||
|
||||
multiply:
|
||||
POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, BX, CX, R13, R14)
|
||||
SUBQ $16, R15
|
||||
CMPQ R15, $16
|
||||
JAE loop
|
||||
|
||||
bytes_between_0_and_15:
|
||||
TESTQ R15, R15
|
||||
JZ done
|
||||
MOVQ $1, BX
|
||||
XORQ CX, CX
|
||||
XORQ R13, R13
|
||||
ADDQ R15, SI
|
||||
|
||||
flush_buffer:
|
||||
SHLQ $8, BX, CX
|
||||
SHLQ $8, BX
|
||||
MOVB -1(SI), R13
|
||||
XORQ R13, BX
|
||||
DECQ SI
|
||||
DECQ R15
|
||||
JNZ flush_buffer
|
||||
|
||||
ADDQ BX, R8
|
||||
ADCQ CX, R9
|
||||
ADCQ $0, R10
|
||||
MOVQ $16, R15
|
||||
JMP multiply
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
MOVQ R8, AX
|
||||
MOVQ R9, BX
|
||||
SUBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB, AX
|
||||
SBBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, BX
|
||||
SBBQ $3, R10
|
||||
CMOVQCS R8, AX
|
||||
CMOVQCS R9, BX
|
||||
MOVQ key+24(FP), R8
|
||||
ADDQ 16(R8), AX
|
||||
ADCQ 24(R8), BX
|
||||
|
||||
MOVQ AX, 0(DI)
|
||||
MOVQ BX, 8(DI)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl
|
||||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
// This function is implemented in sum_arm.s
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
var mPtr *byte
|
||||
if len(m) > 0 {
|
||||
mPtr = &m[0]
|
||||
}
|
||||
poly1305_auth_armv6(out, mPtr, uint32(len(m)), key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl
|
||||
|
||||
#include "textflag.h"
|
||||
|
||||
// This code was translated into a form compatible with 5a from the public
|
||||
// domain source by Andrew Moon: github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-opt/blob/master/app/extensions/poly1305.
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x3ffffff
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3ffff03
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x3ffc0ff
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x3f03fff
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x00fffff
|
||||
GLOBL ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), 8, $20
|
||||
|
||||
// Warning: the linker may use R11 to synthesize certain instructions. Please
|
||||
// take care and verify that no synthetic instructions use it.
|
||||
|
||||
TEXT poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
|
||||
// Needs 16 bytes of stack and 64 bytes of space pointed to by R0. (It
|
||||
// might look like it's only 60 bytes of space but the final four bytes
|
||||
// will be written by another function.) We need to skip over four
|
||||
// bytes of stack because that's saving the value of 'g'.
|
||||
ADD $4, R13, R8
|
||||
MOVM.IB [R4-R7], (R8)
|
||||
MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5]
|
||||
MOVW $·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), R7
|
||||
MOVW R2, R8
|
||||
MOVW R2>>26, R9
|
||||
MOVW R3>>20, g
|
||||
MOVW R4>>14, R11
|
||||
MOVW R5>>8, R12
|
||||
ORR R3<<6, R9, R9
|
||||
ORR R4<<12, g, g
|
||||
ORR R5<<18, R11, R11
|
||||
MOVM.IA (R7), [R2-R6]
|
||||
AND R8, R2, R2
|
||||
AND R9, R3, R3
|
||||
AND g, R4, R4
|
||||
AND R11, R5, R5
|
||||
AND R12, R6, R6
|
||||
MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0)
|
||||
EOR R2, R2, R2
|
||||
EOR R3, R3, R3
|
||||
EOR R4, R4, R4
|
||||
EOR R5, R5, R5
|
||||
EOR R6, R6, R6
|
||||
MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0)
|
||||
MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5]
|
||||
MOVM.IA [R2-R6], (R0)
|
||||
ADD $20, R13, R0
|
||||
MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R7]
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
#define MOVW_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp, offset) \
|
||||
MOVBU (offset+0)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
|
||||
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+0)(Rdst); \
|
||||
MOVBU (offset+1)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
|
||||
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+1)(Rdst); \
|
||||
MOVBU (offset+2)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
|
||||
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+2)(Rdst); \
|
||||
MOVBU (offset+3)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
|
||||
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+3)(Rdst)
|
||||
|
||||
TEXT poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
|
||||
// Needs 24 bytes of stack for saved registers and then 88 bytes of
|
||||
// scratch space after that. We assume that 24 bytes at (R13) have
|
||||
// already been used: four bytes for the link register saved in the
|
||||
// prelude of poly1305_auth_armv6, four bytes for saving the value of g
|
||||
// in that function and 16 bytes of scratch space used around
|
||||
// poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1.
|
||||
ADD $24, R13, R12
|
||||
MOVM.IB [R4-R8, R14], (R12)
|
||||
MOVW R0, 88(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R1, 92(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R2, 96(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R1, R14
|
||||
MOVW R2, R12
|
||||
MOVW 56(R0), R8
|
||||
WORD $0xe1180008 // TST R8, R8 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
EOR R6, R6, R6
|
||||
MOVW.EQ $(1<<24), R6
|
||||
MOVW R6, 84(R13)
|
||||
ADD $116, R13, g
|
||||
MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R9]
|
||||
MOVM.IA [R0-R4], (g)
|
||||
CMP $16, R12
|
||||
BLO poly1305_blocks_armv6_done
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop:
|
||||
WORD $0xe31e0003 // TST R14, #3 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned
|
||||
ADD $100, R13, g
|
||||
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 0)
|
||||
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 4)
|
||||
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 8)
|
||||
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 12)
|
||||
MOVM.IA (g), [R0-R3]
|
||||
ADD $16, R14
|
||||
B poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned:
|
||||
MOVM.IA.W (R14), [R0-R3]
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded:
|
||||
MOVW R0>>26, g
|
||||
MOVW R1>>20, R11
|
||||
MOVW R2>>14, R12
|
||||
MOVW R14, 92(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R3>>8, R4
|
||||
ORR R1<<6, g, g
|
||||
ORR R2<<12, R11, R11
|
||||
ORR R3<<18, R12, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, g, g
|
||||
MOVW 84(R13), R3
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R12, R12
|
||||
ADD R0, R5, R5
|
||||
ADD g, R6, R6
|
||||
ORR R3, R4, R4
|
||||
ADD R11, R7, R7
|
||||
ADD $116, R13, R14
|
||||
ADD R12, R8, R8
|
||||
ADD R4, R9, R9
|
||||
MOVM.IA (R14), [R0-R4]
|
||||
MULLU R4, R5, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULLU R3, R5, (R14, R12)
|
||||
MULALU R3, R6, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R2, R6, (R14, R12)
|
||||
MULALU R2, R7, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R1, R7, (R14, R12)
|
||||
ADD R4<<2, R4, R4
|
||||
ADD R3<<2, R3, R3
|
||||
MULALU R1, R8, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R0, R8, (R14, R12)
|
||||
MULALU R0, R9, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R4, R9, (R14, R12)
|
||||
MOVW g, 76(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R11, 80(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R12, 68(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R14, 72(R13)
|
||||
MULLU R2, R5, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULLU R1, R5, (R14, R12)
|
||||
MULALU R1, R6, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R0, R6, (R14, R12)
|
||||
MULALU R0, R7, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R4, R7, (R14, R12)
|
||||
ADD R2<<2, R2, R2
|
||||
ADD R1<<2, R1, R1
|
||||
MULALU R4, R8, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R3, R8, (R14, R12)
|
||||
MULALU R3, R9, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R2, R9, (R14, R12)
|
||||
MOVW g, 60(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R11, 64(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R12, 52(R13)
|
||||
MOVW R14, 56(R13)
|
||||
MULLU R0, R5, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R4, R6, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R3, R7, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R2, R8, (R11, g)
|
||||
MULALU R1, R9, (R11, g)
|
||||
ADD $52, R13, R0
|
||||
MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R7]
|
||||
MOVW g>>26, R12
|
||||
MOVW R4>>26, R14
|
||||
ORR R11<<6, R12, R12
|
||||
ORR R5<<6, R14, R14
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, g, g
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4
|
||||
ADD.S R12, R0, R0
|
||||
ADC $0, R1, R1
|
||||
ADD.S R14, R6, R6
|
||||
ADC $0, R7, R7
|
||||
MOVW R0>>26, R12
|
||||
MOVW R6>>26, R14
|
||||
ORR R1<<6, R12, R12
|
||||
ORR R7<<6, R14, R14
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6
|
||||
ADD R14<<2, R14, R14
|
||||
ADD.S R12, R2, R2
|
||||
ADC $0, R3, R3
|
||||
ADD R14, g, g
|
||||
MOVW R2>>26, R12
|
||||
MOVW g>>26, R14
|
||||
ORR R3<<6, R12, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, g, R5
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R7
|
||||
ADD R12, R4, R4
|
||||
ADD R14, R0, R0
|
||||
MOVW R4>>26, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R8
|
||||
ADD R12, R6, R9
|
||||
MOVW 96(R13), R12
|
||||
MOVW 92(R13), R14
|
||||
MOVW R0, R6
|
||||
CMP $32, R12
|
||||
SUB $16, R12, R12
|
||||
MOVW R12, 96(R13)
|
||||
BHS poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_blocks_armv6_done:
|
||||
MOVW 88(R13), R12
|
||||
MOVW R5, 20(R12)
|
||||
MOVW R6, 24(R12)
|
||||
MOVW R7, 28(R12)
|
||||
MOVW R8, 32(R12)
|
||||
MOVW R9, 36(R12)
|
||||
ADD $48, R13, R0
|
||||
MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R8, R14]
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
#define MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \
|
||||
MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
|
||||
MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst); \
|
||||
MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
|
||||
MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst)
|
||||
|
||||
#define MOVWP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \
|
||||
MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp); \
|
||||
MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp)
|
||||
|
||||
// func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]key)
|
||||
TEXT ·poly1305_auth_armv6(SB), $196-16
|
||||
// The value 196, just above, is the sum of 64 (the size of the context
|
||||
// structure) and 132 (the amount of stack needed).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// At this point, the stack pointer (R13) has been moved down. It
|
||||
// points to the saved link register and there's 196 bytes of free
|
||||
// space above it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The stack for this function looks like:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// +---------------------
|
||||
// |
|
||||
// | 64 bytes of context structure
|
||||
// |
|
||||
// +---------------------
|
||||
// |
|
||||
// | 112 bytes for poly1305_blocks_armv6
|
||||
// |
|
||||
// +---------------------
|
||||
// | 16 bytes of final block, constructed at
|
||||
// | poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8
|
||||
// +---------------------
|
||||
// | four bytes of saved 'g'
|
||||
// +---------------------
|
||||
// | lr, saved by prelude <- R13 points here
|
||||
// +---------------------
|
||||
MOVW g, 4(R13)
|
||||
|
||||
MOVW out+0(FP), R4
|
||||
MOVW m+4(FP), R5
|
||||
MOVW mlen+8(FP), R6
|
||||
MOVW key+12(FP), R7
|
||||
|
||||
ADD $136, R13, R0 // 136 = 4 + 4 + 16 + 112
|
||||
MOVW R7, R1
|
||||
|
||||
// poly1305_init_ext_armv6 will write to the stack from R13+4, but
|
||||
// that's ok because none of the other values have been written yet.
|
||||
BL poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB)
|
||||
BIC.S $15, R6, R2
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks
|
||||
ADD $136, R13, R0
|
||||
MOVW R5, R1
|
||||
ADD R2, R5, R5
|
||||
SUB R2, R6, R6
|
||||
BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB)
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks:
|
||||
ADD $136, R13, R0
|
||||
MOVW R5, R1
|
||||
MOVW R6, R2
|
||||
MOVW R4, R3
|
||||
|
||||
MOVW R0, R5
|
||||
MOVW R1, R6
|
||||
MOVW R2, R7
|
||||
MOVW R3, R8
|
||||
AND.S R2, R2, R2
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining
|
||||
EOR R0, R0
|
||||
ADD $8, R13, R9 // 8 = offset to 16 byte scratch space
|
||||
MOVW R0, (R9)
|
||||
MOVW R0, 4(R9)
|
||||
MOVW R0, 8(R9)
|
||||
MOVW R0, 12(R9)
|
||||
WORD $0xe3110003 // TST R1, #3 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned
|
||||
WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8
|
||||
MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
|
||||
MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8:
|
||||
WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4
|
||||
MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4:
|
||||
WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2
|
||||
MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
|
||||
B poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned:
|
||||
WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned
|
||||
MOVM.IA.W (R1), [g-R11]
|
||||
MOVM.IA.W [g-R11], (R9)
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned:
|
||||
WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned
|
||||
MOVW.P 4(R1), g
|
||||
MOVW.P g, 4(R9)
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned:
|
||||
WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2
|
||||
MOVHU.P 2(R1), g
|
||||
MOVH.P g, 2(R9)
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2:
|
||||
WORD $0xe3120001 // TST $1, R2 not working see issue 5921
|
||||
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1
|
||||
MOVBU.P 1(R1), g
|
||||
MOVBU.P g, 1(R9)
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1:
|
||||
MOVW $1, R11
|
||||
MOVBU R11, 0(R9)
|
||||
MOVW R11, 56(R5)
|
||||
MOVW R5, R0
|
||||
ADD $8, R13, R1
|
||||
MOVW $16, R2
|
||||
BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB)
|
||||
|
||||
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining:
|
||||
MOVW 20(R5), R0
|
||||
MOVW 24(R5), R1
|
||||
MOVW 28(R5), R2
|
||||
MOVW 32(R5), R3
|
||||
MOVW 36(R5), R4
|
||||
MOVW R4>>26, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4
|
||||
ADD R12<<2, R12, R12
|
||||
ADD R12, R0, R0
|
||||
MOVW R0>>26, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0
|
||||
ADD R12, R1, R1
|
||||
MOVW R1>>26, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R1, R1
|
||||
ADD R12, R2, R2
|
||||
MOVW R2>>26, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R2
|
||||
ADD R12, R3, R3
|
||||
MOVW R3>>26, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R3, R3
|
||||
ADD R12, R4, R4
|
||||
ADD $5, R0, R6
|
||||
MOVW R6>>26, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6
|
||||
ADD R12, R1, R7
|
||||
MOVW R7>>26, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R7, R7
|
||||
ADD R12, R2, g
|
||||
MOVW g>>26, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, g, g
|
||||
ADD R12, R3, R11
|
||||
MOVW $-(1<<26), R12
|
||||
ADD R11>>26, R12, R12
|
||||
BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11
|
||||
ADD R12, R4, R9
|
||||
MOVW R9>>31, R12
|
||||
SUB $1, R12
|
||||
AND R12, R6, R6
|
||||
AND R12, R7, R7
|
||||
AND R12, g, g
|
||||
AND R12, R11, R11
|
||||
AND R12, R9, R9
|
||||
MVN R12, R12
|
||||
AND R12, R0, R0
|
||||
AND R12, R1, R1
|
||||
AND R12, R2, R2
|
||||
AND R12, R3, R3
|
||||
AND R12, R4, R4
|
||||
ORR R6, R0, R0
|
||||
ORR R7, R1, R1
|
||||
ORR g, R2, R2
|
||||
ORR R11, R3, R3
|
||||
ORR R9, R4, R4
|
||||
ORR R1<<26, R0, R0
|
||||
MOVW R1>>6, R1
|
||||
ORR R2<<20, R1, R1
|
||||
MOVW R2>>12, R2
|
||||
ORR R3<<14, R2, R2
|
||||
MOVW R3>>18, R3
|
||||
ORR R4<<8, R3, R3
|
||||
MOVW 40(R5), R6
|
||||
MOVW 44(R5), R7
|
||||
MOVW 48(R5), g
|
||||
MOVW 52(R5), R11
|
||||
ADD.S R6, R0, R0
|
||||
ADC.S R7, R1, R1
|
||||
ADC.S g, R2, R2
|
||||
ADC.S R11, R3, R3
|
||||
MOVM.IA [R0-R3], (R8)
|
||||
MOVW R5, R12
|
||||
EOR R0, R0, R0
|
||||
EOR R1, R1, R1
|
||||
EOR R2, R2, R2
|
||||
EOR R3, R3, R3
|
||||
EOR R4, R4, R4
|
||||
EOR R5, R5, R5
|
||||
EOR R6, R6, R6
|
||||
EOR R7, R7, R7
|
||||
MOVM.IA.W [R0-R7], (R12)
|
||||
MOVM.IA [R0-R7], (R12)
|
||||
MOVW 4(R13), g
|
||||
RET
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !amd64,!arm gccgo appengine nacl
|
||||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
import "encoding/binary"
|
||||
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
var (
|
||||
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 uint32 // the hash accumulators
|
||||
r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 uint64 // the r part of the key
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
r0 = uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff)
|
||||
r1 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03)
|
||||
r2 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff)
|
||||
r3 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff)
|
||||
r4 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff)
|
||||
|
||||
R1, R2, R3, R4 := r1*5, r2*5, r3*5, r4*5
|
||||
|
||||
for len(msg) >= TagSize {
|
||||
// h += msg
|
||||
h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | (1 << 24)
|
||||
|
||||
// h *= r
|
||||
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
|
||||
d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2)
|
||||
d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3)
|
||||
d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4)
|
||||
d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0)
|
||||
|
||||
// h %= p
|
||||
h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
|
||||
h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5
|
||||
h1 += h0 >> 26
|
||||
h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
|
||||
msg = msg[TagSize:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(msg) > 0 {
|
||||
var block [TagSize]byte
|
||||
off := copy(block[:], msg)
|
||||
block[off] = 0x01
|
||||
|
||||
// h += msg
|
||||
h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[12:]) >> 8)
|
||||
|
||||
// h *= r
|
||||
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
|
||||
d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2)
|
||||
d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3)
|
||||
d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4)
|
||||
d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0)
|
||||
|
||||
// h %= p
|
||||
h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
|
||||
h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5
|
||||
h1 += h0 >> 26
|
||||
h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// h %= p reduction
|
||||
h2 += h1 >> 26
|
||||
h1 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h3 += h2 >> 26
|
||||
h2 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h4 += h3 >> 26
|
||||
h3 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h0 += 5 * (h4 >> 26)
|
||||
h4 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
h1 += h0 >> 26
|
||||
h0 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
|
||||
// h - p
|
||||
t0 := h0 + 5
|
||||
t1 := h1 + (t0 >> 26)
|
||||
t2 := h2 + (t1 >> 26)
|
||||
t3 := h3 + (t2 >> 26)
|
||||
t4 := h4 + (t3 >> 26) - (1 << 26)
|
||||
t0 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
t1 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
t2 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
t3 &= 0x3ffffff
|
||||
|
||||
// select h if h < p else h - p
|
||||
t_mask := (t4 >> 31) - 1
|
||||
h_mask := ^t_mask
|
||||
h0 = (h0 & h_mask) | (t0 & t_mask)
|
||||
h1 = (h1 & h_mask) | (t1 & t_mask)
|
||||
h2 = (h2 & h_mask) | (t2 & t_mask)
|
||||
h3 = (h3 & h_mask) | (t3 & t_mask)
|
||||
h4 = (h4 & h_mask) | (t4 & t_mask)
|
||||
|
||||
// h %= 2^128
|
||||
h0 |= h1 << 26
|
||||
h1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20))
|
||||
h2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14))
|
||||
h3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8))
|
||||
|
||||
// s: the s part of the key
|
||||
// tag = (h + s) % (2^128)
|
||||
t := uint64(h0) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:]))
|
||||
h0 = uint32(t)
|
||||
t = uint64(h1) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:])) + (t >> 32)
|
||||
h1 = uint32(t)
|
||||
t = uint64(h2) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:])) + (t >> 32)
|
||||
h2 = uint32(t)
|
||||
t = uint64(h3) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:])) + (t >> 32)
|
||||
h3 = uint32(t)
|
||||
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:], h0)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:], h1)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:], h2)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:], h3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue