Fix the context array size for MPU ports
Ensure the saved context location falls within the reserved context area
rather than overlapping with the next MPU_SETTINGS structure member.
This never caused a problem because actual read/write operations
start from one word before the saved context location.
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Aggarwal <aggarg@amazon.com>
armv8.1-m: Add task dedicated PAC key
To harden the security, each task is assigned a dedicated PAC key, so that attackers needs to guess the all the tasks' PAC keys right to exploit the system using Return Oriented Programming.
The kernel is now updated to support the following:
* A PAC key set with a random number generated and is saved in the task's context when a task is created.
* As part of scheduling, the task's PAC key is stored/restored to/from the task's context when a task is unscheduled/scheduled from/to run.
stack-overflow-check: Introduce portGET_CURRENT_TOP_OF_STACK macro
When MPU wrapper v2 is used, the task's context is stored in TCB and `pxTopOfStack`` member of TCB points to the context location in TCB. We, therefore, need to read PSP to find the task's current top of stack.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed Ismail <Ahmed.Ismail@arm.com>
Earlier the System Call entry from an unprivileged task
looked like:
1. SVC for entering system call.
2. System call implementation.
3. SVC for exiting system call.
Now, the system call entry needs to make only one SVC
call and everything else is handled internally.
This PR also makes the following changes:
1. Update the Access Control List (ACL) mechanism to
grant access to all the kernel objects before the
scheduler is started.
2. Add one struct param for system calls with 5 parameters.
This removes the need for special handling for system
calls with 5 parameters.
3. Remove raise privilege SVC when MPU wrapper v2 is used.
4. Add additional run time parameter checks to MPU wrappers
for xTaskGenericNotify and xQueueTakeMutexRecursive APIs.
Add trace hook macro for most ports
In pull request #659 we introduced better support for tracing
tools like systemview. This patchset adds support for more
ports as requested in the original pull request.
This PR adds Access Control to kernel objects on a per task basis to MPU
ports. The following needs to be defined in the `FreeRTOSConfig.h` to
enable this feature:
```c
#define configUSE_MPU_WRAPPERS_V1 0
#define configENABLE_ACCESS_CONTROL_LIST 1
```
This PR adds the following new APIs:
```c
void vGrantAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTask( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TaskHandle_t xTaskToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToSemaphore( TaskHandle_t xTask,
SemaphoreHandle_t xSemaphoreToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueue( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueHandle_t xQueueToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToQueueSet( TaskHandle_t xTask,
QueueSetHandle_t xQueueSetToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( TaskHandle_t xTask,
EventGroupHandle_t xEventGroupToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToStreamBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
StreamBufferHandle_t xStreamBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToMessageBuffer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
MessageBufferHandle_t xMessageBufferToRevokeAccess );
void vGrantAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToGrantAccess );
void vRevokeAccessToTimer( TaskHandle_t xTask,
TimerHandle_t xTimerToRevokeAccess );
```
An unprivileged task by default has access to itself only and no other
kernel object. The application writer needs to explicitly grant an
unprivileged task access to all the kernel objects it needs. The best
place to do that is before starting the scheduler when all the kernel
objects are created.
For example, let's say an unprivileged tasks needs access to a queue and
an event group, the application writer needs to do the following:
```c
vGrantAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vGrantAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
The application writer MUST revoke all the accesses before deleting a
task. Failing to do so will result in undefined behavior. In the above
example, the application writer needs to make the following 2 calls
before deleting the task:
```c
vRevokeAccessToQueue( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xQueue );
vRevokeAccessToEventGroup( xUnprivilegedTaskHandle, xEventGroup );
```
* Use new version of CI-CD Actions
* Use cSpell spell check, and use ubuntu-20.04 for formatting check
* Format and spell check all files in the portable directory
* Remove the https:// from #errors and #warnings as uncrustify attempts to change it to /*
* Use checkout@v3 instead of checkout@v2 on all jobs
---------
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Enhancements
This commit introduces a new MPU wrapper that places additional
restrictions on unprivileged tasks. The following is the list of changes
introduced with the new MPU wrapper:
1. Opaque and indirectly verifiable integers for kernel object handles:
All the kernel object handles (for example, queue handles) are now
opaque integers. Previously object handles were raw pointers.
2. Saving the task context in Task Control Block (TCB): When a task is
swapped out by the scheduler, the task's context is now saved in its
TCB. Previously the task's context was saved on its stack.
3. Execute system calls on a separate privileged only stack: FreeRTOS
system calls, which execute with elevated privilege, now use a
separate privileged only stack. Previously system calls used the
calling task's stack. The application writer can control the size of
the system call stack using new configSYSTEM_CALL_STACK_SIZE config
macro.
4. Memory bounds checks: FreeRTOS system calls which accept a pointer
and de-reference it, now verify that the calling task has required
permissions to access the memory location referenced by the pointer.
5. System call restrictions: The following system calls are no longer
available to unprivileged tasks:
- vQueueDelete
- xQueueCreateMutex
- xQueueCreateMutexStatic
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphore
- xQueueCreateCountingSemaphoreStatic
- xQueueGenericCreate
- xQueueGenericCreateStatic
- xQueueCreateSet
- xQueueRemoveFromSet
- xQueueGenericReset
- xTaskCreate
- xTaskCreateStatic
- vTaskDelete
- vTaskPrioritySet
- vTaskSuspendAll
- xTaskResumeAll
- xTaskGetHandle
- xTaskCallApplicationTaskHook
- vTaskList
- vTaskGetRunTimeStats
- xTaskCatchUpTicks
- xEventGroupCreate
- xEventGroupCreateStatic
- vEventGroupDelete
- xStreamBufferGenericCreate
- xStreamBufferGenericCreateStatic
- vStreamBufferDelete
- xStreamBufferReset
Also, an unprivileged task can no longer use vTaskSuspend to suspend
any task other than itself.
We thank the following people for their inputs in these enhancements:
- David Reiss of Meta Platforms, Inc.
- Lan Luo, Xinhui Shao, Yumeng Wei, Zixia Liu, Huaiyu Yan and Zhen Ling
of School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University,
China.
- Xinwen Fu of Department of Computer Science, University of
Massachusetts Lowell, USA.
- Yuequi Chen, Zicheng Wang, Minghao Lin of University of Colorado
Boulder, USA.
* Armv8-M: Formatting changes
Signed-off-by: Devaraj Ranganna <devaraj.ranganna@arm.com>
* Armv8-M: Add support for interrupt priority check
FreeRTOS provides `FromISR` system calls which can be called directly
from interrupt service routines. It is crucial that the priority of
these ISRs is set to same or lower value (numerically higher) than that
of `configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY`. For more information refer
to https://www.FreeRTOS.org/RTOS-Cortex-M3-M4.html.
Add a check to trigger an assert when an ISR with priority higher
(numerically lower) than `configMAX_SYSCALL_INTERRUPT_PRIORITY` calls
`FromISR` system calls if `configASSERT` macro is defined.
In addition, add a config option
`configQEMU_DISABLE_INTERRUPT_PRIO_BITS_CHECK` to disable interrupt
priority check while running on QEMU. Based on the discussion
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1122, The interrupt
priority bits in QEMU do not match the real hardware. Therefore the
assert that checks the number of implemented bits and __NVIC_PRIO_BITS
will always fail. The config option
`configQEMU_DISABLE_INTERRUPT_PRIO_BITS_CHECK` should be defined in the
`FreeRTOSConfig.h` for QEMU targets.
Signed-off-by: Devaraj Ranganna <devaraj.ranganna@arm.com>
* Use SHPR2 for calculating interrupt priority bits
This removes the dependency on the secure software to mark the interrupt
as non-secure.
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Aggarwal <aggarg@amazon.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Devaraj Ranganna <devaraj.ranganna@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Aggarwal <aggarg@amazon.com>
Co-authored-by: Gaurav Aggarwal <aggarg@amazon.com>
Co-authored-by: Gaurav-Aggarwal-AWS <33462878+aggarg@users.noreply.github.com>
* Add supposrt for ARM CM55
* Fix file header
* Remove duplicate code
* Refactor portmacro.h
1. portmacro.h is re-factored into 2 parts - portmacrocommon.h which is
common to all ARMv8-M ports and portmacro.h which is different for
different compiler and architecture. This enables us to provide
Cortex-M55 ports without code duplication.
2. Update copy_files.py so that it copies Cortex-M55 ports correctly -
all files except portmacro.h are used from Cortex-M33 ports.
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Aggarwal <aggarg@amazon.com>
Co-authored-by: Gaurav Aggarwal <aggarg@amazon.com>
Gaurav-Aggarwal-AWS
Ahmed Ismail
ActoryOu
Soren Ptak
kar-rahul-aws
Moral-Hao
Boris van der Meer
Jeff Tenney
Devaraj Ranganna
Paul Bartell
Dusan Cervenka
alfred gedeon